

PARTISANSHIP IN THE URBAN SOUTH: A STUDY IN CHANGE,
1960-1974

By

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To Donald

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By

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Traditional Democratic hegemony in the South broke down in the 1950's and 1960's, and the Republican party has made significant inroads in many areas of the South. Considerable research has explored the extent, sources, and meaning of electoral changes in the South and has developed several theories of partisan realignment including three tested in this study. "Convergence" theory suggests that the South is becoming more like the rest of the nation in its partisanship patterns conforming to the class-based partisan patterns that emerged during the New Deal era. "Distinctive realignment" theory proposes instead that changing partisan patterns in the South may maintain distinctively southern political patterns based on the racial issue. Finally, "national realignment" theory hypothesizes that the nation is entering a new period of national partisan realignment to which we must now compare the South.

These three theories were tested within the context of two representative though differing southern urban communities---Richmond, Virginia, and Greenville, South Carolina. Through the use of precincts and their

social characteristics, it was possible to analyze partisan patterns within population social subgroups over a period of time at the presidential, gubernatorial, and local electoral levels. Special techniques were devised to allow the social characterization of community precincts through census tract data.

Study results include several findings. First, the electorates in Richmond and Greenville, despite differing social composition, are behaving similarly at the presidential and gubernatorial levels with differences occurring most clearly at local levels. Second, middle class whites in both communities tend to vote Republican consistently, especially at the presidential and gubernatorial levels; working class whites exhibit volatile behavior supporting no one party consistently, especially at the presidential level. Third, whereas study findings indicate that middle class whites tend to vote in accord with their economic interests, they also suggest that working class whites are more apt to exhibit racially motivated political behavior. Finally, despite similarities of electoral behavior in Richmond and Greenville, differences occur at all levels which appear to relate to their respective Border South and Deep South locations.

Undoubtedly, southern electoral behavior resembles the national pattern more closely than twenty years ago; across-the-board convergence, however, is not occurring in the urban South. To the extent that a class-based partisan alignment is developing, it is confined to middle class whites who tend to vote Republican consistently, especially at the presidential and gubernatorial levels. Distinctive realignment in the sense that it involves partisan alignments based on racially motivated electoral behavior appears largely limited to working class whites and is

expressed in a volatile rather than stable partisan behavior. While there is no conclusive evidence of a new national partisan realignment, several writers on realignment suggest that national political patterns may indeed be taking on certain southern characteristics. Many northern working class whites, like their southern counterparts, are feeling the pull of racial antipathies as well as economic interests and are expressing their feelings in their electoral behavior.

Study findings suggest similarities in political behavior between the two communities which possibly typify many or most southern urban communities. The South, however, is not a monolith; especially at the local electoral levels southern communities may be developing a variety of political patterns. These varying partisan patterns may have several sources including the Deep South or Border South location of the urban community.

CHAPTER I

PARTISAN REALIGNMENT IN THE SOUTH: AN INTRODUCTION

The South was once the exclusive province, politically, of the Democratic party. From post-reconstruction days until the middle of the twentieth century, at all electoral levels from local town councils to the Presidency, the Democratic party dominated the electoral process. Republican voters, candidates, and officeholders were scarce and scattered. During the past twenty years this state of affairs has changed dramatically. Republican voting has increased steadily, though irregularly, at the presidential level; Republican officeholders not only exist but continue to increase at all levels; third-party movements have had a measure of success as well.

Despite twenty years of analysis, speculation, and prediction, scholars continue to dispute the nature and causes of political change in the South.¹ What are needed are localized studies of changing parti-

¹See, in chronological order, Alexander Heard, A Two-Party South? (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952); Donald S. Strong, Urban Republicanism in the South (University, Alabama: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1960); James W. Prothro et al., "Two-Party Voting in the South," American Political Science Review, 52 (March, 1958), 131-139; Donald S. Strong, "Durable Republicanism in the South," in Change in the Contemporary South, ed. Allan P. Sindler (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1963), 174-194; Philip E. Converse, "On the Possibility of Major Political Realignment in the South," in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966), Chapter 12; Bernard Cosman, Five States for Goldwater: Continuity, Change in Southern Presidential Voting Patterns (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1966); M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmond Zeigler, "Electoral Strategies and Voting Patterns

san alignments to test theories of partisan change developed within the literature. In the context of individual communities, these theories of partisan change may be evaluated.

It is my purpose in this dissertation to study partisan alignments in the 1960's and 1970's, especially as they emphasize the emergence of Republican voting from the once solidly Democratic South. More specifically, I intend to explore those alignments in the context of two urban communities--Richmond, Virginia and Greenville, South Carolina. Both Richmond and Greenville lie in the urbanized Piedmont region of the South. Both have experienced those factors frequently associated with political change in the South and commonly cited as major factors in partisan change--urbanization, suburbanization, industrialization, and in-migration. Both have experienced significant gains in Republican voting since World War II. Within the setting of these two communities, I can begin to explore a number of questions raised in the realignment literature. What patterns of partisan alignment have emerged in the sixties and seventies? Do these patterns represent a shift in the social bases of partisan cleavage? Do my two communities reflect similar or differing patterns of partisan cleavage? Does the racial issue continue to be significant to partisan alignment? To the extent that partisan realignment has occurred, does this realignment represent the convergence of southern with national patterns or is it a change unique to

in a Southern Congressional District," in The Electoral Process, ed. M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmond Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 122-138; Anthony M. Orum and Edward W. McCranie, "Class, Tradition, and Partisan Alignments in a Southern Urban Electorate," Journal of Politics, 32 (February, 1970), 156-176; Donald S. Strong, "Further Reflections on Southern Politics," Journal of Politics, 33 (May, 1971), 239-256; and Jerry Perkins, "Bases of Partisan Cleavage in a Southern Urban County," Journal of Politics, 36 (February, 1974), 208-214.

the South? If the former, is the South belatedly experiencing the national realignment of the New Deal era, or is it moving along with the rest of the country through a new realignment period?

Partisan Realignment in the South

That the solidly Democratic South has disappeared is firmly established. We have only to observe the election of Republican governors, United States Senators, and United States Representatives in most southern states to realize this fact. The significance of the voting behavior that has replaced the solidly Democratic pattern is much less clear. Scholars of electoral behavior have disagreed in their evaluations of southern voting behavior, especially as to its causes, trends, and future direction; but most have discussed that behavior in terms of some kind of partisan realignment.²

Partisan Realignment Defined

Partisan realignment refers to a durable change in the alignment of party followings relative to a previously established socially-based division of groups. A recent study in Greensboro, North Carolina, suggests that realignment may manifest itself in two ways: 1) change in the distribution of partisan choice, and 2) change in the composition

²V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics, 17 (February, 1955), 3-18; Gerald Pomper, "Classification of Presidential Elections," Journal of Politics, 29 (August, 1967), 535-566; Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), 1-10; William H. Flanigan and Nancy H. Zingale, "Measurement of Electoral Stability and Change," paper presented at the 67th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, in Chicago, September 7-11, 1971; and James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973).

of party followings.³ Distribution of partisan choice is the proportion of the vote awarded to the several parties within population groups. The composition of a party following is the relative share of the party vote contributed by various population groups.⁴

Partisan realignment may follow several varied patterns. V. O. Key, who wrote extensively on partisan realignment, observed that realignment may occur slowly, gradually, and largely in response to societal change ("secular realignment"); or it may represent rapid, extensive change in response to an external crisis such as war or depression ("major realignment"). Additionally, partisan realignment may involve all elements of society or be confined to specific groups or regions ("partial realignment").⁵

Interpretations of Partisan Realignment

Many scholars have investigated partisan realignment as a by-product of political change in the South; few agree as to the nature of that realignment. However, three major theories of partisan realignment recur throughout the literature and merit extended discussion.

Convergence. The most frequently mentioned interpretation of

³Charles Prysby and James Svava, "Political Change in Guilford County: Two Decades of Partisan Realignment," paper presented at the Southern Political Science Association Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, November, 7-9, 1974, p. 1

⁴Prysby and Svava, "Political Change in Guilford County," p. 1. While such scholars of electoral behavior as Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960) would suggest that any definition of partisan realignment must revolve around change in party identification on the part of the voter, it should be noted that my study as well as Svava's utilize aggregate electoral and social data rather than survey data. The nature of the data necessitates and warrants a definition which takes the data base into consideration. Chapter III discusses this point in greater detail.

⁵V. O. Key, Jr., "Secular Realignment and the Party System," Journal of Politics, 21 (May, 1959), 198-210.

realignment in the South is the convergence of southern voting to those patterns established in the North by the New Deal realignment.⁶ The New Deal realignment brought about class polarization and differential minority group behavior within the electorate. The Democrats appealed disproportionately to the working class; and the Republicans relied on the more affluent, better-educated middle class for their support. According to the theory of convergence, the urbanization, industrialization, and in-migration, which the South is currently experiencing, has brought differentiation and increased Republican voting paralleling the nonsouthern experience. As the South becomes more like the rest of the nation socio-economically, its political behavior should become, to a significant degree, more like that of the rest of the nation. This kind of change would be gradual and would be an example of "secular realignment."

The early literature of realignment stressed that convergence would take place gradually with impressive Republican gains primarily at the presidential level and primarily in the large, urban, affluent areas of the South. The facts of the late 1960's and early 1970's suggest that Republican growth, if not convergence, has proceeded at a faster pace than anticipated. In many areas of the South, the Republican party has formed alliances, established power bases, and developed support at all electoral levels. It has offered full slates of candidates for

⁶Strong, "Durable Republicanism in the South"; Jennings and Zeigler, "Electoral Strategies and Voting Patterns"; Converse, "On the Possibility of Major Political Realignment," p. 242; Orum and McCranie, "Class, Tradition, and Partisan Alignments," pp. 174-176; Strong, "Further Reflections on Southern Politics"; Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, 254-259; and Perkins, "Bases of Partisan Cleavage."

state and local elective offices and has seriously challenged Democratic control.⁷

Donald Strong and others⁸ have suggested that as the national Democratic party abandoned its historic acceptance of segregation and moved in the direction of endorsement of Black aspirations, the South has allowed itself to react to politics without the one-party commitment imposed by racial anxiety. Instead, southerners are now making their political choices on the basis of economic and social factors more characteristic of political choices in the rest of the nation. Moreover, in the 1950's, the Republican party presidential choice of Eisenhower was sufficiently popular in the South to make a break from Democratic voting easier. The continued choice in the 1960's and 1970's of presidential candidates attractive to the South made presidential Republicanism in the South respectable and durable among the middle and upper economic classes in the cities.

The Republican party, encouraged by these trends, could ill-afford to ignore its newest voters and was spurred to increased activity and organization at all levels. This new state of southern politics, though coming more rapidly than expected, has been perceived as proof positive of the convergence of southern political behavior to national patterns of class-based voting and partisan conflict over economic issues.

Distinctive realignment. A second line of scholarly argument suggests that the South is changing in ways that maintain its distinc-

⁷Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, p. 264-269.

⁸See Sindler, Change in the Contemporary South.

tive character rather than move it in line with the rest of the country as convergence theory suggests. This second possibility I have designated as "distinctive realignment theory." For example, the growth of Republicanism in the South may represent, instead of convergence, the development of a black-white political alignment where the Republican party has become the party of the southern whites and the Democratic party has become the party of blacks and white liberals. Obviously, such an alignment has racial overtones and raises an important question of the significance of the racial issue to southern voting behavior today. Thirty years ago V. O. Key isolated the racial issue as pivotal to understanding southern political behavior.⁹ To what extent is that issue still pivotal today?

Philip Converse considers and rejects the possibility of realignment around the racial issue. Although he states that the racial issue has some of the ingredients of a crisis issue around which realignment could take place, Converse rejects the idea that the two parties represent clear-cut alternatives, vis-à-vis the racial issue, to the voters.¹⁰

James Sundquist argues that even though stable realignment has not taken place on the basis of race, the racial issue is still important to voting behavior in the South.¹¹ He shows that in areas of high black concentration, the whites have developed a volatile voting pattern, anti-Democratic at the national level, Republican or third-party independent at lower levels. This volatility frequently swings with the

⁹V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949), p. 5.

¹⁰Converse, "On the Possibility of Major Political Realignment," p. 240.

¹¹Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, p. 261.

racial stance of the candidates. Sundquist rejects the notion of realignment on the basis of race; he suggests, however, the possibility of continued nonalignment or volatility on the part of substantial numbers of southerners due to the factor of race. This possibility is significant to understanding southern voting behavior and may serve to maintain a distinctive southern political pattern.

National realignment. Several scholars suggest that the South may, in fact, be moving along with the rest of the nation into a new major realignment.¹² Kevin Phillips speaks of the white South, along with middle-sector whites in the North, moving together into a new Republican majority. Scammon and Wattenberg discuss a nationwide movement to "politics of the middle." They point out that the vast majority of the American electorate is middle class, middle-aged, middle-minded, unyoung, unpoor, unblack. The American electorate is moving toward the broad center in American politics not to its extremes.¹³ Samuel Lubell speaks of the "southernization" of national politics whereby many northern voters, like their southern counterparts, are feeling the pulls of racial anxieties in addition to traditional economic pulls. Lubell points to the 1968 Wallace sympathy and vote among northern workers as evidence of a new force making politics of the North and South more alike.¹⁴

¹²See Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1969); Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970); Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics; and Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System.

¹³Scammon and Wattenberg, The Real Majority, Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

¹⁴Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), p. 87.

Richmond and Greenville As Experimental Units

The testing of the foregoing major theories of partisan realignment within the context of two southern communities form the basic substance and framework of this study. Richmond and Greenville, as representative southern communities, thus become experimental units in which to observe changing partisan alignments and to evaluate the degree to which southerners may be maintaining distinctive political patterns, moving in the direction of northern political patterns, traditional or new, or developing politically in yet to be determined directions.

Site Selection

I have chosen to explore partisan realignment and Republican growth within the context of two southern urban communities--Richmond, Virginia, and Greenville, South Carolina. Previous studies have concentrated on political change and partisan realignment in a single community and have generalized their findings to the urban South.¹⁵ Increasing social heterogeneity in the South, however, necessitates the exploration of differing trends and varying explanations for political change. Comparison of two representative, but dissimilar, southern cities can achieve this aim.

The literature on political change in the South firmly establishes the city as the locality for the most dramatic development of Republican voting and for the most thorough breakdown of Democratic hegemony. The Piedmont South is an emerging megalopolis which lies in between the southern Appalachians and the coastal plains, stretching

¹⁵Orum and McCranie, "Class, Tradition, and Partisan Alignments," and Prysby and Svava, "Political Change in Guilford County."

from Atlanta to Richmond. The numerous cities within the Piedmont have experienced those trends so often linked with political change in the South--rapid urbanization, industrialization, and in-migration. They have also witnessed a surge in Republican voting.

In selecting two cities within the Piedmont, I had several criteria. First, the cities had to have experienced substantial urbanization, industrialization, and in-migration over the past twenty years. Second, the cities had to have experienced substantial increase in Republican voting during the 1960's. Third, the cities had to vary somewhat in overall social characteristics. Almost any two urbanized areas in the Piedmont would easily meet the first two requirements.

Both Richmond and Greenville have experienced those socio-economic changes associated with political modernization in the South. Both have had growth rates substantially above those in the states in which they reside as well as above the southern and national averages. (See Table 1.) Migration figures are above or comparable to those in the Piedmont region. Greenville is a manufacturing community with a differentiated class structure; the middle class is substantial in size, but the working class elements comprise a majority of the population. White collar employment, median family income, and median education are below the national average but rank significantly above the corresponding state measures. Richmond, on the other hand, is a white collar community with an affluent, substantial middle class which should respond to the social and economic cues of the New Deal realignment. Thus, the conditions generally associated with increased Republicanism are clearly present in Richmond and in Greenville.

The pattern of Republican voting in both communities will be

Table 1. Social Characteristics and Comparative Data for Richmond, Virginia and Greenville, South Carolina, 1970

Area ^a	Population Increase	Non-White Population	Migrant Population ^b	Manufacturing Population	White Collar Population	Median Family Income
United States	13.3%	12.5%	17.1%	25.9%	48.2%	\$9590
South	14.2	19.7	18.8	23.1	45.4	8079
Richmond	24.9	27.4	24.5	20.1	56.9	9939
Virginia	17.2	19.1	24.4	22.4	49.0	9049
Greenville	23.8	18.5	15.7	33.5	45.5	8867
South Carolina	8.7	30.7	15.5	36.2	37.3	7621

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

^aNote that the figures for Richmond and Greenville are for their "urbanized areas" as defined by the Bureau of the Census.

^b"Migrant Population" represents that proportion of the population which has moved in from outside the area (region, state, etc.).

discussed in detail in the next chapter. To summarize, Greenville has experienced substantial Republican growth at all electoral levels with Republicans holding numerous offices in the city council, county council, and state legislature. Prior to the middle sixties, these offices were held by Democrats. On the other hand, Richmond has not experienced the depth in realignment that Greenville has; nonetheless, its degree of Republican growth was such that James Sundquist has chosen Richmond to illustrate the phenomenon of urban Republicanism.¹⁶

In regard to the third criterion, Richmond and Greenville vary in two important regards. First, they vary in their racial composition. Greenville has the smallest nonwhite population in the Piedmont whereas Richmond has one of the highest nonwhite populations in the Piedmont. Second, the two cities differ in class structure, Greenville having a blue collar predominance and Richmond a white collar population predominance. Both of these differences could be important influences on the voting behavior of the communities in regard to the issues under discussion in the dissertation.¹⁷ Moreover, as we shall observe in Chapter IV, the size and political activity of the white collar middle classes in Richmond is such that the political behavior of the working class could be obscured. The social composition of Greenville, with its large working class white population, allows me to throw the political behavior of this group into sharp relief in a way that Richmond does not allow.

¹⁶Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, pp. 254-255.

¹⁷In determining which cities to use, I looked at the six largest "urbanized areas" in the Piedmont--Atlanta, Greenville, Charlotte, Greensboro, Winston-Salem, and Richmond. Atlanta was ruled out because its size would eliminate the ability to use a second city. Greensboro has just recently been subject for a very similar study. Charlotte and Richmond are very similar on paper and would present an interesting comparison in a later study.

CHAPTER II

CITIES IN PARTISAN TRANSITION: RICHMOND AND GREENVILLE

The possibility of partisan realignment of a formerly solidly Democratic region has evoked continuing speculation and commentary. As the previous chapter suggests, one of the primary questions centers on the regional status of the South. Is the South maintaining its distinctive flavor in politics or is it becoming, in some fashion, more national in perspective? A better understanding of this question as it relates to partisan realignment forms the central core of this study.

Richmond and Greenville, as census data cited in the previous chapter reveal, have experienced social and economic development typical of most urban areas of the South. Additionally, these communities have witnessed sufficient political change to suggest that partisan realignment is taking place.

"Partisan realignment" involves, in part, durable changes in party support which include changes in the distribution of partisan choice.¹ The synopsis of political behavior to follow must demonstrate that both Richmond and Greenville have experienced changes in the distribution of partisan choice and that these changes have been durable to some degree.

¹See Chapter I, pp. 3-4.

Partisan Choice and Partisan Identification

Distribution of partisan choice indicates the proportion of a vote awarded to the several parties in a given election. To the extent that a basic change has taken place over time in the proportion of votes going to these parties in Richmond and Greenville, the possibility of realignment exists.

Much of recent electoral behavior research, especially that done by the Survey Research Center in Michigan, has stressed that one important determinant of partisan choice is partisan identification, i.e., the voter's perception of his loyalty to and identification with one of the national parties.² These studies, however, have relied for their data on sample surveys of individuals. This study uses precincts and census tracts, i. e., groups of individuals in political and social units, as its data base.

While we have no direct aggregate data on partisan identification for the two cities chosen, we do have a clear record of actual voting behavior and are not dependent upon remembered or anticipated behavior, as in the case of surveys.³ Through the observation of actual voting behavior, particularly patterns of partisan choice, we will be able to observe the extent of durable changes in the partisan choice of voters. Partisan choice and its distribution, as recorded in actual vote totals and percentages, form the basic data for this study. Through a careful

²See Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), and Philip E. Converse, "On the Possibility of Major Political Realignment in the South," in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966), Chapter 12.

³Further discussion of survey and aggregate data analysis follows in the next chapter.

analysis of partisan choice in the two communities, this study attempts to make some observations concerning partisan identification and its change.

Durability and Choice of Elections

One way of going beyond analysis of partisan choice to observations of partisan identification is looking at durability of partisan choice. Durability in partisan choice may manifest itself in two ways:

- 1) durability of partisan choice over several electoral levels and
- 2) durability of choice over time.

Durability of Choice Over Electoral Levels

Changes in the distribution of partisan choice may be occurring at several electoral levels, presidential, gubernatorial, local, United States Senate and House, and others. To the extent that changes are occurring at more than one level, and especially at local levels, we can be more confident that durable changes in partisan choice, and perhaps changes in partisan identification, are present.

For the purposes of this dissertation, three representative and diverse electoral levels were selected--presidential, gubernatorial, and local. The use of presidential and gubernatorial elections presented no problems in the compilation of data; the use of the local elections to examine local political behavior required some adjustments.

Ideally, for local elections, one should study city council or county council elections. These elections, undoubtedly, best represent partisan orientation at the local level. County council elections were readily available for the Greenville "urbanized area," but this was not

the case in Richmond. The city of Richmond, the largest unit in Richmond's "urbanized area,"⁴ has nonpartisan elections for its city council. Since partisan city council elections were unavailable, state house elections were used instead. While not "local" in the strictest sense of the word, the state legislator would be much more local in orientation than the governor. To provide data comparable to Richmond's, information was collected in Greenville for state house elections as well as county council elections.

Durability of Choice Over Time

Just as changes in partisan choice at several electoral levels may reflect durability of change as well as change in partisan identification, so changes in partisan choice that persist over several time points may reflect durability of change and underlying shifts in partisan identification. Ideally, one should study the period encompassing the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's. City and county data, available for this whole period, are used in this chapter. Unfortunately, at the precinct level, lack of election data coupled with the limitations in the census data somewhat restrict the time frame of analysis in the ensuing chapters.

Time span in Richmond. In-depth analysis of political change in Richmond will cover the period 1960-1974, at least for the city of Rich-

⁴The "urbanized area" is a census-designated area including the central cities and the urbanized fringe surrounding them. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter III, this study had to fit together census data and precinct data. For logistical reasons related to the problem of "fit" and further explained later, I am using the census-defined "urbanized area" as the study's inclusive unit rather than the "standard metropolitan statistical area" (SMSA) or city boundaries.

mond itself. The city of Richmond is an independent city⁵ surrounded by several counties, two of which comprise with the city, the Richmond urbanized area. The United States Bureau of the Census has collected social and economic data, by blocks, for the entire urbanized area, only in the 1970 Decennial Census. Prior to 1970 the Census Bureau gathered data by blocks only for incorporated cities of a certain size. Since census block data form the materials for associating social and economic census data with political data by precinct as discussed further in Chapter III, in-depth data analysis in the urbanized areas of Henrico and Chesterfield Counties can only cover the period 1965-1975. It should be noted that 1970 census data will be used to cover this entire period. Census data from the 1960 Census is drawn upon for the city of Richmond in the 1960-1965 period.

Time span in Greenville. In Greenville, like Richmond, census block data are available for the city and surrounding urbanized areas of Greenville County only in the 1970 Census. This fact as well as limitations in the availability of political data restrict the analysis in the urbanized area to elections between 1968 and 1975. South Carolina has allowed its local communities very little autonomy until recently; state and local election records have been subject to minimal state requirements until the 1970's. The result is the inability to determine precinct lines for city or county prior to 1968 as well as the lack of complete returns in the late 1960's. Despite the lack of data in the early 1960's, we do know that political competition during this period

⁵Large incorporated cities in Virginia are granted independent status. As a result, independent cities and the counties surrounding them are entirely separate political and geographic units.

was minimal. Our primary data loss concerns the presidential level in the early 1960's.

Political Change in Two Southern Urban Communities

What follows is an overview of changes in partisan choice in Richmond and Greenville--an attempt to ascertain the extent of change at three electoral levels and across as broad a time range as possible. From this preliminary analysis observations were made concerning the possibility of partisan realignment and the advisability of further analysis to determine the nature of partisan realignment vis-a-vis the theories proposed in Chapter I.

Partisan Choice in Richmond, Virginia

Presidential level. James Sundquist cites Richmond to illustrate presidential Republicanism and points to the 13% jump in the Republican share of the vote (from 28% to 41%) from the 1944 presidential election to the 1948 election.⁶ The Republican share of the vote rose another 18% in 1952 and rose again in 1956 to 60.6%. As these figures and Table 2 illustrate, the Republican share of the presidential vote has dropped under 50% only once in the last 25 years and that was in 1964. It should be noted that while the party of George Wallace came in third in 1968, it pulled a sizable 17.2% of the votes away from the major parties giving the Republican party a bare 50.3% majority in Richmond.

Gubernatorial elections. Gubernatorial Republicanism in Richmond has taken form much more slowly as Table 3 readily indicates. The

⁶James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973).

Table 2. Richmond: Presidential Vote, 1960-1972
(Percent Party Vote)

Election Year ^a	Republican	Democrat	Independent
1960 ^b	60.4%	39.0%	--
1964 ^b	43.2	56.8	--
1968 ^c	50.3	32.4	17.2% ^d
1972 ^c	70.6	28.3	.9

^aData were unavailable for the entire urbanized area in the early 1960's. Footnotes in this and following tables will inform the reader what data was relied on for which figures.

^bData available for city elections only.

^cData available for entire urbanized area.

^dAmerican Independent Party (AIP).

Republican gubernatorial candidates throughout the fifties and sixties garnered between one-third and 45% of the vote; but they never seriously challenged Democratic supremacy. In 1965 and after, volatility in partisan choice replaced Democratic control. In 1965 the Conservative party polled 22.6% of the vote, less than 10% behind the Republicans. In 1969 the Republicans swept Richmond with 63.6% of the vote in a coalition of blacks, Labor, and regular Republicans. At the time political analysts speculated whether the Republicans could hold onto their majority vote without such a strange group of bedfellows; but the Republicans maintained 60% of the 1973 vote. The volatility of Virginia state politics becomes clearer when one realizes that the Republican candidate in 1973 was a former southern Democratic governor of Virginia turned Republican, and his opponent was a liberal populist Democrat turned Independent. To the extent that Mills Godwin, the 1973 Democrat-turned-Republican, succeeds in pulling his former Democratic support with him to the Republican party on a permanent basis, partisan stability and a degree of gubernatorial Republicanism may replace the political volatility of the sixties.

State legislative elections. Table 4 indicates that Republican realignment is not taking place at the state house level in Richmond. Republican candidates in the 1950's captured only 9% to 20% of the vote; and in 1961 the Republicans offered candidates for no offices. Republicans began to gain support, in the middle sixties, polling around a third of the total vote but lost ground in the seventies and ran no opposition at all in the city legislative district in 1975. Throughout the 1960's and 1970's there have been independent candidates polling

Table 3. Richmond: Gubernatorial Vote, 1952-1975
(Percent Party Vote)

Election Year	Republican	Democrat	Independent
1953 ^a	43.9%	54.3%	--
1957 ^a	35.5	64.2	--
1961 ^a	37.5	62.5	--
1965 ^b	32.2	44.6	22.6% ^c
1969 ^b	63.6	34.7	1.7
1973 ^b	60.0	--	40.0

^aData available for city elections only.

^bData available for entire urbanized area.

^cConservative party.

Table 4. Richmond: House of Delegates Vote, 1961-1973
(Percent Party Vote)

Election Year ^a	Republican	Democrat	Independent
1961 ^b	--	92.2%	7.8%
1965 ^c	36.9%	58.1	4.9
1969 ^c	30.4	62.1	7.6
1973 ^c	25.6	58.1	16.3

^aThe Richmond urbanized area consists of more than one multi-membered district. In 1965 and 1969 there were two legislative districts included in the urbanized area, one for Henrico County and Richmond and one for Chesterfield County. In 1973 three legislative districts are involved plus a floater seat, one district in each of the counties, one in Richmond, and one floater seat for Richmond-Henrico. To derive the percentages in this table, all Republican, Democratic, and Independent votes for House were tallied for each multi-membered district (or part thereof). Then party vote was totaled for all districts (or parts thereof) involved in a given election and divided by total votes for House to determine each party's vote percentage.

^bData available for city district only.

^cData available for entire urbanized area.

between 5% and 8% of the vote and polling a high of 16.3% in 1973.

Richmond: a summary. Traditional voting patterns in Richmond have unquestionably broken down at the presidential and gubernatorial levels. Republicanism appears durable though not stable in proportion at the presidential level; and the volatility which marked gubernatorial realignment in the 1960's seems to be giving way to durable Republican voting support in the 1970's. At the state house level, however, Republican organization and effort have made no durable inroads, except perhaps in the counties surrounding the city of Richmond.

At all three levels, third party volatility has occurred. As the 1968 presidential election, the 1965 gubernatorial election, and the 1973 state legislative election indicate, as much as 15%-plus of the electorate has succumbed to independent voting when the opportunity presented itself.

Partisan Choice in Greenville, South Carolina

Presidential elections. Prior to 1960 Greenville voters responded in accord with traditional southern respect for states' rights and racial conservatism. Native son Strom Thurmond received 61.6% of the county vote for the Dixiecrat party in 1948. Independent Electors for Harry Byrd in 1956 garnered 16.7% of the total vote in Greenville County. During this period the Republicans limped along with less than 20% of the vote in 1944 and a miniscule 9.7% in 1948. Eisenhower's popularity pulled 56.2% of the vote in 1952 but waned in 1956, appealing to 39.8% of the county's electorate. Republican interest, however, was picking up in the city of Greenville. The city maintained a Republican majority for Eisenhower in 1956; that slight majority in the city

Table 5. Greenville: Presidential Vote, 1952-1972
(Percent Party Vote)

Election Year ^a	Republican	Democrat	Independent
1952 ^b	56.2%	43.8%	--
1956 ^b	39.8	43.5	16.7% ^d
1960 ^b	61.8	38.2	--
1964 ^b	62.3	37.7	--
1968 ^c	52.8	24.4	22.9 ^e
1972 ^c	79.0	17.9	3.1

^aData were unavailable for the entire urbanized area prior to the mid-1960's. Footnotes in this and following tables will inform the reader what data was available for which figures.

^bData available for Greenville County.

^cData available for the entire urbanized area.

^dIndependent Electors for Harry Byrd.

^eAmerican Independent Party.

swelled to 69.8% in 1960. The city and the surrounding urbanized area have been voting Republican at the presidential level ever since, reaching a high of 79% in 1972. (See Table 5.)

Even in 1968 with Wallace's candidacy, the Republicans maintained a slight majority. The American Independent Party (AIP) percentage of 22.9% of the vote, however, apparently reflects a continuing protest against major party stands on states' rights and racial issues.

Gubernatorial elections. The Republican party ran no candidates at the gubernatorial level until 1966. In the three elections since then, Republicans in Greenville have captured an increasing share of the vote with a high of 67.2% of the vote in 1974. (See Table 6.) Gubernatorial Republicanism seems a durable part of the Greenville scene.

Table 6. Greenville: Gubernatorial Vote, 1954-1974
(Percent Party Vote)

Election Year	Republican	Democrat	Independent
1954	No Republican Competition		
1958	No Republican Competition		
1962	No Republican Competition		
1966 ^a	46.4%	53.6%	--
1970 ^a	51.4	47.3	1.4%
1974 ^a	67.2	29.6	1.7

^aData available for entire urbanized area.

State house and local elections. Despite the difficulty of securing electoral statistics for the early and middle sixties, the data

indicate that the Republicans made significant gains at the state legislative level during the 1960's. The Democrats went unchallenged in 1962; in 1964 the Republicans picked up one seat in the delegation, and two years later they won six of the eleven legislative seats in the district. In the four elections between 1968 and 1974, the Republicans failed to capture a majority of the total vote except in 1972 (See Table 7); but they retained a substantial number of the delegation seats throughout the period. In 1974 the presence of independent challengers as well as the change from a multi-member district to single-member districts cut the Republican share of the vote substantially; nonetheless, Republicans still hold four of the eleven seats in the district.

Table 7. Greenville: State House Vote, 1968-1974
(Percent Party Vote)

Election Year ^a	Republican	Democrat	Independent
1968 ^b	48.4%	51.6%	--
1970	46.2	53.8	--
1972	51.9	48.1	--
1974	43.4	50.3	6.3%

^aUrbanized Greenville lies within a single legislative district. Until 1972 this was an eleven member, multi-membered district. In 1972 the district subdivided into eleven single-membered districts.

^bAll data for these years available for entire urbanized area.

At the county council level, the Republicans have maintained a competitive proportion of the vote since its creation in 1968 capturing

a majority of the votes in 1972 and 1974 as well as a majority of the members of the county council. (See Table 8.) In state house as well as county council elections, there is evidence of durable local Republicanism in Greenville.

Table 8. Greenville: County Council Vote, 1968-1974
(Percent Party Vote)

Election Year ^a	Republican	Democrat	Independent
1968	48.3%	51.7%	--
1970	47.4	52.6	--
1972	53.3	46.7	--
1974	52.9	42.6	4.5%

^aAll figures are for the urbanized area.

Greenville: a summary. Greenville experienced dramatic gains in Republican voting at all levels during the 1960's and into the 1970's. There is clear evidence of durability over time and across electoral levels.

Partisan Choice and Partisan Realignment: Observations

Greenville and Richmond represent different temporal patterns of partisan choice. In Greenville, Republican partisanship came late, developed rapidly, and appears durable at all levels. In Richmond, presidential Republicanism took shape as early as the 1940's, and remained durable across time at that level. Traditional gubernatorial partisanship broke down more slowly. Volatility replaced Democratic solidarity,

and durable gubernatorial Republicanism appears to be developing. Any growth of Republicanism in state house elections appears to be disintegrating. There is evidence of durable Republicanism and thus partisan realignment in Richmond, but not at all levels or to the same extent at each level.

Two patterns of partisan choice may well reflect two differing patterns of partisan realignment. To what extent does the pattern of partisan choice reflect similar patterns of partisan realignment within the context of different kinds of communities? How do these communities relate to the theories raised in Chapter I? Do they show the South going in a unified direction or in divergent directions with respect to the national political pattern?

The answers to such questions concerning the nature of partisan choice and realignment in two communities can come only through careful examination and analysis of partisan choice and realignment within different population groups at the lowest possible political unit, the precinct. Compilation of precinct data for social and economic groups within the communities and analysis of grouped, or aggregate, data at the precinct level requires special operations which must be outlined before discussing the results of my examination.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Voting precincts form the basic statistical units of this study of voting behavior; but since precincts record electoral data only and this study is concerned with social and economic dimensions of voting behavior, it will be necessary to derive precinct social and economic characteristics from census tract data which compile statistics pertinent to area social and economic life. Census tracts and precincts are entirely separate geographic units rarely coinciding in Richmond and Greenville; therefore, in order to utilize census tract information to characterize precincts socially and economically, special operations must be performed on the data to make it correspond with precincts. These operations will be discussed thoroughly; but it must be emphasized at the start of methodological considerations that this is an "ecological" approach dealing with groups of individuals, in the form of precincts and census tracts, rather than with individuals themselves.

While many studies of electoral behavior have relied on aggregate or grouped data, other studies have focused directly on individual behavior as measured by sample surveys.¹ Each approach to the study of elec-

¹Examples of electoral research based on aggregated data include: Walter C. Kaufman and Scott Greer, "Voting in a Metropolitan Community: An Application of Social Area Analysis," Social Forces, 38 (March, 1960), 196-204; James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, 58 (December, 1964), 876-887; Charles Prysby and James Svava, "Political

toral behavior has its advantages and disadvantages; a comparison of the two will highlight the limitations as well as strengths of my chosen approach.

Survey Research and Ecological Analysis Compared

Survey analysis draws on the findings of surveys which record the behavior and attitudes of samples of individuals and then generalizes about the behavior and attitudes of similar groups of individuals in the broader population. Ecological analysis studies the behavior of groups of individuals located in units such as precincts or census tracts then attempts, in many cases, to generalize about the behavior of individuals located in those units.

Data Versatility of the Two Approaches

Survey research is more versatile in the type of data collected. Besides recording the political behavior (voting, political interest, etc.) of individuals, survey data can register past political behavior of the same individual as well as partisan identification, attitudes towards issues and candidates, and other psychological data.

Ecological data, while not as versatile in types of information produced, deal with empirical electoral behavior of groups rather than remembered or predicted behavior of individuals. Ecological or grouped

Change in Guilford County: Two Decades of Partisan Realignment," paper presented at the Southern Political Science Association Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 7-9, 1974; David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 79-84. The classic examples of electoral research based on surveys are: Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), and Philip E. Converse, "On the Possibility of Major Political Realignment in the South," in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966).

data are well suited to observing the electoral behavior of population subgroups; survey data, on the other hand, may lack sufficient sampling of crucial subgroups as is important in this study. Moreover, ecological data are more readily available. Surveys must be drawn up and executed before data are available; ecological data collect regularly in electoral records and census materials ready to be used. To the extent that these records have collected over the years, comparisons and analysis of change over time among various political units or groups are relatively easy tasks. Several surveys over a period of time are rarely available in the same community making analysis of change more difficult with survey data. The easy availability of census and political records as well as the special suitability of ecological data to observe the behavior of population subgroups guided the decision to use ecological data.

Data Assumptions of the Two Approaches

In using ecological data, one must make assumptions concerning the differences between grouped and individual data as well as make assumptions concerning the way in which individuals are grouped into units such as precincts. These are difficult assumptions which will be explained in detail in the following section. Survey data, however, require other demanding assumptions. Attitudinal measures must be accurate, samples representative, and questionnaires valid and reliable.

Ecological Analysis and Ecological Fallacy

The choice of a research instrument, like many other choices in academic research, is a "trade-off." In this case, versatility of data has been traded for ready availability and comparability of data; one

set of assumptions have been rejected only to consider another set of assumptions.

Ecological analysis presents its first major problem when researchers want to make assumptions concerning individual behavior on the basis of ecological relationships. However, to accept correlations from ecological studies as approximations of correlations made from studies of individuals is to risk the "ecological fallacy." Correlations from ecological studies tend to exaggerate the correlations produced in studies of individuals. For example, one cannot assume that the correlation in this study between social class and Republican voting would have the same value at the precinct level as at the individual level. In all likelihood the correlation found, when ecological methods were employed, between social class and Republican voting would be greater in value at the precinct level than if applied to the individual level. Hubert Blalock has stated that "in shifting from one unit of analysis to another we are very likely to affect the manner in which outside and possibly disturbing influences are operating on the dependent and independent variables under consideration."²

One can attempt at least to minimize the errors of estimation inherent in the ecological fallacy. This study uses the smallest possible unit of analysis, the precinct. The use of the precinct instead of city, county, legislative, congressional, or other larger unit should inhibit the degree of inflation in any ecological correlations used. A second means of minimizing errors of estimation inherent in the ecological fallacy is the choice of the statistical measure used. Of the two

²Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 98.

possible statistical measures, the ecological correlation coefficient or the ecological regression coefficient, the latter has the advantage of being less sensitive to ecological fallacy.³

Correlation Coefficient or Regression Coefficient?

The ecological correlation coefficient of variables derived from grouped data measures the extent to which variation in one variable, e. g., social class, is related to variation in another variable, e. g., percentage Republican vote. The ecological correlation measures the strength of relationship between the two variables without designating one as producing the variation (or causing the variation) in the other variable. In ecological approaches the correlation between social class and Republican voting would increase as we move from the individual to the precinct level of analysis and again as we moved to county or legislative district levels. The cause for this appears to lie in the way in which individuals are grouped into units.

Political units, such as precincts, are usually geographic entities. Individuals may be grouped within precincts according to certain social, economic, or other variables. For example, individuals may tend to group according to their social class; middle class individuals tend to live near other middle class individuals, and working class individuals tend to live near other working class individuals. Where social class is taken to be the independent variable and Republican voting the dependent variable and where individuals are grouped into geographic units (precincts) according to their scores on the independent variable

³Ibid., Chapter IV. See also W. Phillips Shively, "'Ecological' Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals," American Political Science Review, 63 (December, 1969), pp. 1183-1196.

(social class), the ecological correlation coefficient found, when ecological methods were employed, would be greater in value at the precinct level than if applied to the individual level. The ecological regression coefficient, in contrast, for the same variables will closely approximate individual level regression coefficients and thus better measure individual behavior.

The regression coefficient, like the correlation coefficient, measures the relationship between variables such as social class and Republican voting. The regression coefficient, however, is not a measure of strength of relationship; instead, it is a proportional measure with one variable producing or causing change in another. The regression coefficient indicates how much change a unit change in the independent variable (social class in this study) produces in the dependent variable (Republican voting). The regression coefficient, unlike the ecological correlation coefficient, is less vulnerable to ecological fallacy--that is, the regression of social class and Republican voting at the precinct level should better approximate the individual level regression coefficient than the ecological correlation for those two variables would approximate the individual level correlation.⁴ Since regression coefficients are less sensitive to ecological fallacy than correlation coefficients, this study relies on regression coefficients as much as possible.

Assumptions to be Made for Regression Coefficients

Still, the requirements of regression analysis must be carefully met. First, individuals must be grouped into geographic units primarily by their scores on the independent variable and/or by random assignment.

⁴Refer to both Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research, and to Shively, "Ecological Inference."

In the data, the precincts tend to group according to racial composition and, within white areas, according to social class. Both racial composition and social class are primary independent variables in this study. Several precincts in a small community within Greenville's urbanized area but outside the city of Greenville seemed to group as much on the dependent variable, voting behavior, as along the independent variables and were dropped from the analysis.

Second, it is important that any significant extraneous variables (that is, causes of the dependent variable also associated with the independent variable) are properly controlled. Every effort has been made in the way the regression analysis was carried out to anticipate this situation. Chapter IV discusses the way in which this requirement has been met.⁵

Third, one must assume that contextual effects are unimportant within the data;⁶ if the neighborhood social context has as strong an influence on political behavior as an individual's socio-economic position, then difficulties in ecological interpretation arise. Fortunately, most studies of neighborhood social context on voting behavior find only weak contextual influence and thus, apparently, the problem of contextual influence may be safely ignored.⁷

⁵See Chapter IV, pp. 50-51.

⁶See Prysby and Svara, "Political Change in Guilford County," p. 5. Also see Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan, eds., Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969), particularly the articles by Erik Allardt, Tapani Valkonen, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Juan J. Linz.

⁷See David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain; and David R. Segal and Stephen H. Wildstrom, "Community Effects on Political Attitudes: Partisanship and Efficacy," Sociological Quarterly, 11 (Winter, 1970), 67-86. Strong contextual effects are found by David R. Segal and Marshall M. Meyer, "The Social Context of Political Partisanship," in Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. Dogan and Rokkan.

Social Area Analysis and Electoral Study

In the early 1950's Eshref Shevky and Wendell Bell developed a typology of social areas within an urban setting by relying on the census tract as the basic area unit and describing the tracts according to their variations along certain social dimensions.⁸ While the dimensions of the Shevky-Bell typology are not suited to this particular study, the underlying concept that areas within an urban setting can be aggregated and described according to certain social dimensions is very useful because the procedure can be adapted readily for political analysis.

Several studies, in fact, have attempted to adapt the basic Shevky-Bell typology to political analysis. Walter Kaufman and Scott Greer followed the typology closely in their study of metropolitan St. Louis in the late 1960's. The two authors state in their introduction that political data are readily available in voting records which report past political acts of the population in given precincts and that these data can be translated into estimates of the way people in given census tracts voted. That is, areas not only could be described according to their social and economic characteristics but according to their voting characteristics as well. Since precinct boundaries do not generally coincide with census tracts, Kaufman and Greer had to "fit" the precincts to the tract boundaries. Where precincts lay across two or more census tracts, the vote was allocated by the proportion of the population in each tract through the use of block statistics.⁹

⁸Eshref Shevky and Wendell Bell, Social Area Analysis (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955).

⁹Kaufman and Greer, "Voting in a Metropolitan Community," p. 200, fn. 11.

James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield in their study in St. Louis¹⁰ and Charles Prysby and James Svava in their study in Greensboro¹¹ illustrate an approach utilizing the precinct as the basic unit of analysis. Both studies have attempted to characterize precincts according to social and economic characteristics found in census tract data. Since Wilson and Banfield were dealing with small suburban towns and city wards where precincts and census tracts overlapped, the use of census tract data presented no difficulties. In the latter study and in this one, precincts and census tracts do not necessarily overlap; and the characterization of precincts according to social and economic characteristics becomes difficult.


"Fitting": Bringing Together Social and Political Data

This study relies on two kinds of aggregate data, political and social, and involves two different geographic units, the precinct for political data and the census tract for social data. Political data are recorded, by precincts, as electoral totals; social data are recorded, by census tract or block, as social and economic statistics every ten years.

Although the precinct is the basic unit of analysis, precincts must be described according to social characteristics recorded by census tracts. Precincts are created by community election boards and the census tracts by the United States Bureau of the Census; there is no necessary correlation between the two in size or boundaries. As Figure 1 illustrates, precincts may fall within census tracts, encompass census

¹⁰Wilson and Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior."

¹¹Prysby and Svava, "Political Change in Guilford County."



- Urbanized Area Boundaries
- Precinct Boundaries
- Census Tract Boundaries

Figure 1. A Pictorial Illustration of the Relationship
Between Census Tracts and Precincts in the Data,
Hypothetical Community

tracts, overlap two or more census tract boundaries, and very occasionally coincide with census tract boundaries. Precinct boundaries have changed occasionally to meet city needs, and some census tract boundaries have changed from one census tract to another. Moreover, census data are based on samples of the population. Some data like enumeration, race, and house values are based on 100% samples; other data like family income, education, and occupation are based on only 5% and 15% samples of the total population. These factors complicate the task of bringing together precinct data and census data in such a way as to describe the social characteristics of precincts.

The fitting of census tract data to precincts is the biggest hurdle in wedding census and election materials to study partisan realignment. It is possible to group precincts and census tracts together into zones in order to minimize the lack of fit between precincts and census tracts. This was done in the recent study in Greensboro. Since several precincts and census tracts must be brought together to form a zone, there would be an enlargement in the unit of measure and the loss of information provided by the smaller units of analysis. Moreover, since exact fitting probably still would be impossible, a certain amount of guesswork would be involved.

Fitting: Estimation of Social Values for Precincts

In an effort to keep the unit of analysis as small as possible, this study relies on a method of fitting census data to precincts to maintain the precinct as the unit of analysis. This method involved the use of block statistics and estimation of unknown precinct social and economic characteristics.

For every block in an urbanized area census tract, the Census Bureau records statistics based on the 100% census sample. Locating, through the use of census and precinct maps, all the blocks encompassed by a given precinct, one can easily determine for each precinct in the urbanized area such statistics as racial composition, rate of owner-occupancy, rent values, and house values. However, one major social variable in this study, occupation, is based on 15% or 5% census samples and therefore is available for the entire census tract but not for the blocks.¹² One cannot, therefore, determine the value of occupation at the precinct level unless one finds a satisfactory way of estimating its precinct value accurately. I determined that one could indeed accurately estimate the value for occupation at the precinct level if occupation were highly enough correlated with race, owner-occupancy, rent values, and house values---four variables whose values were known at block, precinct, and census tract levels. Following the steps outlined below, precinct values were computed for occupation at the precinct level and then used in the analysis.

Step-by-step procedure: canonical correlation. First, two correlation matrices were computed for race, owner-occupancy, rent values, and house values, one using precinct level data and the other using census tract level data in each community; then the two matrices were compared by means of a canonical correlation. A canonical correlation analyzes the interrelationships between two sets of variables measured on

¹²The procedure outlined on the following pages was used to predict family income, education, and in-migration as well as occupation. The values for these three variables, like occupation, were available only at the census tract level and had to be predicted at the precinct level. These variables are not mentioned in the text for the sake of clarity and because they affect only a small amount of my analysis.

the same subjects to determine if the same pattern of relationships holds for both sets. If the canonical correlation exceeds .7, we can presume that indeed the same patterns of relationship do hold for both sets. The canonical correlations for the data are recorded in Table 9 and indicate that those interrelationships among race, owner-occupancy, rent values, and house values for the precinct hold also for the data at the tract level.¹³

Table 9. Canonical Correlations Between Census Tract and Precinct Intercorrelation Matrices for Variables Race, Owner-Occupancy, Rent Values, and House Values

City and Time Period ^a	Canonical Correlation
Richmond, 1960-1964	.98
Richmond, 1965-1970	.97
Richmond, 1971-1975	.96
Greenville, 1968-1974	.85

^aPrecinct lines in the Richmond urbanized area changed several times in the whole period under study. The different periods in the table reflect the changes.

Step-by-step procedure: development of regression equations.

Second, it was necessary to determine how well the four variables race, owner-occupancy, rent values, and house values could predict occupation, when both were measured at the census tract level. In order to accom-

¹³For more information on canonical correlations, refer to IBM, Inc., 1130 Scientific Subroutine Package: Programmer's Manual (White Plains, N. Y.: IBM Technical Publication, 1967), pp. 30-32, 156-158.

plish this, we used the regression equation of the general form,
 $Y = a + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 + b_4x_4$. In this equation Y, the dependent variable, measures the census tract values of occupation; and the x's, the independent variables, measure race, owner-occupancy, rent values, and house values, where the census tract values are used. Solving the equation for a and b's, an R^2 was derived indicating the goodness of fit of the four variables taken together to the observed data points of occupation at the tract level. For example, according to Table 10, in Richmond, the variables race, owner-occupancy, rent values, and house values, taken together explain 81% of the variation in the variable occupation at the tract level. This percentage is well above the .5 level which statisticians consider to be the threshold of significance for the R^2 statistic. Thus, the goodness of fit is such that we can feel confident estimating the value of occupation at the precinct level as explained in the next section.¹⁴

Table 10. R^2 for Independent Variables, Race, Owner-Occupancy, House Values, and Rent Values, and Dependent Variable, Occupation

City and Census ^a	R^2
Richmond, 1960 Census	.81
Richmond, 1970 Census	.80
Greenville, 1970 Census.	.80

^aAll variables were measured at the census tract level.

¹⁴Regression equations were run for the social variables, educa-

Step-by-step procedure: deriving values. One can now estimate the values of occupation at the precinct level by using the same regression equation. The coefficients for a and b's attained by solving the equation the first time were then applied to the precinct values of the four x's instead of the census tract values. Solving for Y, we could now predict the precinct values of occupation. This step provided the occupational values to be used in the analysis.

Error Factors in the Data

There is no doubt some error present in the data. Some may arise from using census data from 1960 and 1970 to measure the social characteristics of precincts for elections not falling in those exact years. The 1960 census data were used to characterize precincts in the years 1960 to 1964 and 1970 census data to characterize precincts in the years 1965 to 1974.¹⁵ Additional error may come from routine clerical error, either in the original compilation of the data or in my processing of the data. Lastly, there is unquestionably some error in the estimates of social variables derived by the above method but perhaps no more than in the guesswork involved in fitting by other methods. The

tion, family income, and in-migration as well as occupation. For education and family income the R^2 registered in excess of .5 for both cities. In the case of in-migration, R^2 was in excess of .5 only for Greenville.

¹⁵The following census materials were drawn on for this study: U. S. Census of Housing: 1960, City Blocks, Richmond, Virginia, Urbanized Area; U. S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960, Census Tracts, Richmond, Virginia, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area; Census of Housing: 1970, Block Statistics, Greenville, South Carolina, Urbanized Area; Census of Housing: 1970, Block Statistics, Richmond, Virginia, Urbanized Area; Census of Population and Housing: 1970, Census Tracts, Greenville, South Carolina, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area; and Census of Population and Housing: 1970, Census Tracts, Richmond, Virginia, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.

error present in my manner of "fitting" is counteracted by the sensitivity retained by using the smallest possible unit of analysis.

Outline of Research Analysis

In the ensuing chapters this study shall take up the independent variables and discuss their relationship to the topic of partisan realignment. The variable occupation will be discussed as it helps determine whether a class-based politics, as has been common outside the South, is developing in the urban South. Secondary discussion of the variable in-migration in Greenville will be used to aid in this discussion.

Next follows a discussion of the variable race and of "distinctive realignment," that is, change in the alignment of party followings which may maintain the distinctive character of the South rather than move it in line with the rest of the country. In this regard, independent voting behavior and the bearing it has on the theory of distinctive realignment will be considered.

In an attempt to tackle the possibility that the South may, in fact, be part of a new "national realignment," it will be necessary to reconsider all of the previous data in light of this possibility and come to some conclusions concerning what kind of political behavior is occurring in the South in the 1970's.

CHAPTER IV

PARTISAN REALIGNMENT AND SOCIAL CLASS: IS CONVERGENCE TAKING PLACE?

Speculation and commentary abound concerning the nature of political change and partisan shift in the South; frequently cited theories of change suggest the possibility that the urban areas of the South are developing partisan patterns similar to those prevalent outside the South. The findings discussed in Chapter II indicate that partisan patterns in Richmond and Greenville have shifted in the last fifteen years, but the question arises as to whether or not the types of changes taking place represent a convergence of southern voting patterns to class-based patterns established outside the South.

The Theory of Convergence Reviewed

The theory of convergence postulates, specifically, that partisanship in the South is developing along the lines of the New Deal realignment which shifted partisan alignments outside the South in the 1930's and 1940's.¹ Earlier in the century rapid urbanization, industrialization, and in-migration occurred in the North and brought with them increased class differentiation. As a result partisan alignment outside the South began to polarize according to class or minority group; the Democrats appealed disproportionately to the working class, the Republicans to the

¹The convergence theory is discussed in Chapter I, pp. 4-6.

more affluent, better-educated middle classes.

Early proponents of convergence pointed out that the South, in the 1940's and 1950's, experienced rapid urbanization, industrialization, and in-migration; they concluded that these factors would bring with them increased class differentiation and Republican voting as had been the case outside the South. They stressed, however, that partisan shift in the South would be gradual and would occur primarily at the presidential level in the affluent urban areas.

The pattern in Richmond, at least superficially, fits this description. Republicans made early gains at the presidential level; slowly, in the late 1960's, they began to strengthen their position at the gubernatorial level. The Greenville experience, however, represents a different pattern which deviates from the gradual, presidential partisan shifts that the early literature of realignment describes. In many areas of the South, as in Greenville, Republicans increased their share of the vote rapidly, offered complete slates of candidates for state and local elective offices, and seriously challenged Democratic control.²

The realignment literature of the early 1960's suggests three possible explanations for more rapid increases of Republican strength in some areas of the South. First, the presidential candidacy of Eisenhower was immensely popular in the South and attracted many southern votes. A vote for Eisenhower in the 1950's eased the break from Democratic voting in later presidential elections. The continued choice in the 1960's and 1970's of presidential candidates attractive to the South made presidential Republicanism respectable and durable among middle and upper class southern urbanites.

²See footnote 7, Chapter I.

Second, the national Democratic party changed its attitudes toward civil liberties. Racial conservatism served, historically, as the basis of the tie between the Democratic party and the South since Reconstruction; but in the 1940's and 1950's the Democratic party began to openly endorse black aspirations. No longer could southerners react to politics according to traditional attachments based on race; they were now free to make political choices on the basis of economic and social factors more characteristic of political choices in the rest of the nation.

Third, the Republican party, encouraged by its successes at the national level, increased its activity and organization at all levels. This, in turn, allowed southerners, often for the first time, to vote Republican further down the ticket.

The Theory of Convergence and Methodology

Chapter II suggested that shifts in partisan choice are durable enough to imply some partisan realignment in both communities. Whether this realignment represents convergence is the subject of this chapter.

How Can We Tell If Convergence Is Occurring in the Data?

According to voting literature, convergence implies specific patterns in the relationship between voting and social factors. First, convergence requires a positive relationship between Republican voting and social class. Second, that relationship should strengthen over time as southerners feel more guided by their social and economic interests than by their traditional ties to the Democratic party. Third, in accord with the party alignments produced by the New Deal, southern working

class whites should increasingly support the Democratic party while the more affluent middle classes should increasingly support the Republican party. If convergence is occurring in Greenville and Richmond, these partisan patterns should emerge within my data.

Measures of Social Class

The theory of convergence depends on the relationship between Republican voting and social class. Social class is a composite variable made up of many facets. An ecological study might draw on such measures of objective class position as education, income, and occupation; a survey analysis might rely on subjective measures, such as perceived class position, as well. For a comparative ecological study of voting behavior, occupation is probably the best single indicator of social class.³ In fact, the manual/nonmanual occupational distinction is itself good at differentiating class behavior. Studies have shown a fairly sharp separation in political behavior between the lowest of the white collar groups (sales and clerical) and the highest of the manual groups (craftsmen, etc.).⁴

This study relies on occupation as the primary indicator of social class. The relationships of occupation, income, and education are highly intercorrelated for both cities; the use of income and education in addition to occupation would add very little explanatory power to my analysis. (See Table 11.)

The manual/nonmanual occupational distinction set out in the census materials differentiates blue collar and white collar occupations,

³Robert R. Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 73-79.

⁴Ibid., p. 77.

Table 11. Correlations of Family Income and Education With
Occupation for Richmond and Greenville

Elections ^a	Occupation and Education	Occupation and Income
Richmond, 1960, President	.94	.93
Richmond, 1969, Governor	.98	.90
Greenville, 1970, Governor	.97	.89

^aCorrelation coefficients are given for elections closest to the bicentennial census--that is, 1960 and 1970. Since the variables occupation, education, and income are all derived from census statistics and not from electoral statistics, their recorded value will only change from one census to another.

respectively. As to class distinctions, it also differentiates well the working and middle classes. This study measures occupation in terms of white collar occupations (that is, nonmanual occupations) which include "professional, technical, and kindred workers," "managers and administrators, except farm," "sales workers," and "clerical and kindred workers."⁵ The proportion of work force made up of these occupations constitutes the white collar or middle class percentage in each precinct.

Statistical Treatment of the Data

The relationship between occupation and voting behavior has been examined through regression analysis for each election under study. For each election in the analysis, we have designated occupation as independent variable explaining or influencing "percent Republican vote," the dependent variable.

The effects of racial composition on voting behavior are discussed in the next chapter, but both occupation and racial composition were run together as independent variables in my regression equation. This way it was possible to take advantage of the "partial" nature of regression coefficients and thus control for extraneous variables as required by the assumptions discussed in Chapter III.

Unlike education and income which are highly intercorrelated with occupation, racial composition correlates less highly with occupation; and its effects as an extraneous variable must be taken into account in the regression equation. (See Table 12.) Regression analysis accom-

⁵See the occupational classification in Census of Population: 1970.

plishes this through the "partial" nature of the regression coefficient which not only measures the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable but also controls the effects of other independent variables in the equation on the dependent variable.⁶ Thus, the "partial" regression coefficient for occupation (social class) and Republican voting assures that the relationship between social class and Republican voting is not disturbed by the effects of the racial variable.

Table 12. Correlations Between Occupation and Racial Composition for Richmond and Greenville

Elections	Occupation and Racial Composition
Richmond, 1960, President	-.91
Richmond, 1969, Governor	-.85
Greenville, 1970, Governor	-.59

Interpretation of regression coefficients. Regression coefficients are not measures of strength of relationship as are correlation coefficients. Put simply, regression coefficients indicate how much change, and in what direction, a unit change in the independent variable produces in the dependent variable. In my data in accordance with the theory of convergence, we would expect a positive relationship between class and Republican voting—that is, as the middle class, or white collar percentage, in precincts increases, so should the instance of Republican voting. A regression coefficient of, say, .43, in my data indicates

⁶Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 328.

a positive relationship where a one percent increase in white collar percentages produces a .43% increase in Republican voting. Unlike the correlation coefficient, the regression coefficient does not become significantly strong when it reaches a particular value, say .7. The regression coefficient is a proportion relating social class and voting and not a measure of strength; it takes on significance as it is compared with other regression coefficients which are greater, lesser, or equal in value.

The regression coefficient is also a measure of differentiation in working class and middle class Republican voting patterns. As the coefficient approaches zero, the two groups become more alike in their voting behavior. Because of two additional factors we know that regression coefficients reflect almost exclusively the differentiation in middle class white and working class white Republican voting patterns. First, there are no middle class black precincts in either city; second, in all-black precincts blacks are voting overwhelmingly Democratic. These two factors effectively exclude most blacks from the data pool for the regression of social class and Republican voting thus sharpening our focus on white class-differentiated behavior.⁷

Multiple regression and goodness of fit: R^2 . Along with the regression coefficients, multiple regression analysis computes a single statistic, coefficient of multiple correlation, R , indicating the degree of relationship between the independent variables and a dependent variable. The square of that coefficient, R^2 , measures the goodness of fit of the independent variables, taken together, in explaining the dependent

⁷This would not be the case in Richmond in the early 1960's where many blacks did vote Republican.

variable. In the data, R^2 answers two questions. How much of the variation present in Republican voting from precinct to precinct can be explained by social class (and racial composition)? How good is social class in predicting Republican voting behavior in the precincts? If R^2 exceeds .5, we can say that the fit is good. If R^2 is lower than .5, other factors are apparently more important in that particular election.

Partisan Alignment, Social Class, and Republican Voting:
What Has Replaced Democratic Control?

Chapter II discusses in detail the importance of changes in the distribution of partisan choice to the study of partisan realignment. The proportions in which voters divide their votes between the two major parties must shift significantly from a previously established pattern in order for us to say that partisan realignments are occurring. Chapter II documents that the once solidly Democratic hold on these two communities has broken down and that Republicans have made substantial gains. Does this change represent a class-based division of the vote hypothesized by the theory of convergence?

The theory of convergence asserts that the relationship between social class and partisan voting is such that the two variables are positively related, the relationship increases over time, and middle class whites are voting Republican whereas working class whites are tending to support the Democratic party. A quick glance at Tables 13 and 14, indeed, indicates a positive relationship between social class and Republican voting. This positive relationship confirms the breakdown of democratic monopoly in these two communities but fails to reveal a consistent convergence pattern. The relationship between social class and

Republican voting follows inconsistent patterns over time and across the electoral levels studied. The lack of a neat across-the-board convergence pattern requires the search for narrower patterns within the data. Perhaps convergence is occurring at one electoral level and not another;

Table 13. Richmond: Matrix of Regression Coefficients for Social Class and Republican Voting, 1960-1973

Election Level	1960	1961	1964	1965	1968	1969	1972	1973
President	.57		.48		.81		.25	
Governor		.06		.57		.35		.78
State House		--		.54		.40		.40

perhaps partisan realignment has taken place among one social class and not another; perhaps volatility or instability better describes the electoral behavior of some groups. Close scrutiny of the data should reveal cohesive patterns such as these or others at each electoral level for the cities combined. These patterns produce some order and understanding to the relationship between social class and Republican voting in my data.

Table 14. Greenville: Matrix of Regression Coefficients for Social Class and Republican Voting, 1968-1974

Election Level	1968	1970	1972	1974
President	.75		.13	
Governor		.29		.54
State House	.43	.39		.20
County Council	.53	.49		.57

Presidential Volatility

Volatility or instability in the relationship between social class and Republican voting best describes presidential voting behavior in both communities. The 1968 presidential election illustrates well class-based Republican voting; the regression coefficients for social class and Republican voting indicate that partisan voting has divided along class lines. Middle class whites are voting Republican as convergence theory hypothesizes whereas working class whites are casting their vote elsewhere. We can surmise that working class whites were voting for George Wallace or perhaps for Democrat Hubert Humphrey, but few were voting Republican according to the regression coefficients.

Class-based voting at the presidential level, however, is not typically so strong. It fluctuates at lower values in the early 1960's, hits a highwater mark in 1968, then plummets in 1972. The very low regression coefficients in 1972 indicate that working class whites as well as middle class whites were drawn to Republican Nixon in large numbers. It is my conjecture that at the presidential level middle class whites are supporting Republican candidates consistently but that the working class whites are behaving with a good deal of volatility--voting Republican, Democratic, or Independent depending on issues and candidates. This latter point will be subject to confirmation later in the study.

Unlike any other American election, the presidential election focuses on candidate images and on issues of nationwide importance. The volatility of response at the national level undoubtedly reflects the impact of changing issues and changing voter reaction to candidates more, perhaps, than changing attitudes to traditional party loyalty. Democratic dominance at the presidential level, to the extent that it existed in the

1950's and 1960's, has dissolved; stable realignment based on class cleavage has not replaced it.

Gubernatorial Realignment

In both communities at the gubernatorial level, one discovers movement from Democratic electoral monopoly in the early 1960's to greater class-based Republican voting in the 1970's. In the early 1960's Republicans ran no candidate for governor in South Carolina, and in Richmond the Republican candidate running attracted few votes. In both cases the Democrats maintained control over gubernatorial politics, and the traditional southern pattern held sway. However, regression coefficients in subsequent years indicate a sharp shift from the traditional voting pattern. A positive relationship between social class and Republican voting appeared in the middle 1960's and has increased in the 1970's in both communities. Partisan realignment along class lines characterizes gubernatorial politics in both Greenville and Richmond although this realignment appears stronger in Richmond than in Greenville. To the extent that realignment stabilizes, we might say that partial realignment is operating in these cities at the gubernatorial level.

Table 13 indicates that the 1969 gubernatorial election breaks the developing realignment pattern in Richmond. The regression coefficient for that election drops in the midst of an overall increasing regression pattern indicating a break with the developing class-based pattern noted in the other gubernatorial elections. To see further evidence of this election's deviating nature, it would be helpful to refer to the R^2 statistic which tests how well the independent variables under study (here social class and racial composition),⁸ taken together,

⁸Refer back to pp. 50-51 of this chapter. The variable racial

explain "Republican voting," the dependent variable. The R^2 for this election is much lower than R^2 for other gubernatorial elections in Richmond. (See Table 15 for R^2 for Richmond elections.) The R^2 for the 1969 election is only .35--i. e., only 35% of the variation in voting behavior is explained by class and racial composition together. The R^2 for the 1961, 1965, and 1973 elections are .96, .68, and .93, respectively, all well in excess of the .5 significance threshold. With the help of the R^2 statistic, we can see that different factors than usual were operating in this election and that it should be termed deviating in respect to other gubernatorial elections.⁹

Table 15. Richmond: R^2 for Elections, 1960-1973
(The Variables Racial Composition and Occupation are Predicting Republican Voting)

Election Level	1960	1961	1964	1965	1968	1969	1972	1973
President	.79		.93		.90		.94	
Governor		.96		.68		.35		.93
State House		--		.70		.63		.35

State House Elections: A Parting of Ways

Thus far two cities which differ greatly in their social structure have been behaving similarly in presidential and gubernatorial elections.

composition is referred to here only because it was part of the equation used to derive the R^2 used in this discussion.

⁹This discussion concerning the 1969 gubernatorial election is reinforced by the facts discussed in Chapter II, p. 20. Here it was mentioned that, unlike other gubernatorial elections, a coalition of blacks, Labor, and regular Republicans came together to elect Virginia's first Republican governor since Reconstruction.

Even at the state house level surface similarities appear in the data. The pattern of relationship between social class and Republican voting definitely decreases for both communities. Whereas there was no Republican competition in the early 1960's, a positive relationship appeared in the middle sixties but has been declining since then.

Although the patterns of regression coefficients for Richmond and Greenville in state house elections resemble one another in some respects, distinct differences underlie the meaning of the regression coefficients. Greenville has a much stronger Republican base at the state house level than Richmond. In Richmond at no time in the period under study, have the Republicans run complete slates of candidates or garnered more than 36.9% of the vote. In 1973 the Republicans received only 25.6% of the vote. In Greenville the Republicans have been running complete slates of candidates since the early 1960's, and Republican candidates have received from 43.4% to 51.9% of the vote throughout the late sixties and early seventies.

The regression coefficients for Richmond reflect a tendency, though decreasing, for middle class whites to cast the relatively few Republican votes. Still Democrats predominate, even among middle class whites in Richmond. Richmond does not appear to be moving far from the traditional Democratic pattern at the state house level. Greenville, on the other hand, has maintained a sizable Republican vote in the late 1960's and 1970's but, at the same time, has experienced a decline in class-based Republican voting. The decline in regression coefficients for state house elections reflects a weakening of class-based voting that finds many working class whites as well as middle class whites voting Republican, especially in the most recent election.

It should be noted that the 1974 state house election in Greenville is possibly a deviating election. Not only did the regression coefficient sink especially low, but the R^2 for that election was much lower than for other state house elections. (See Table 16 for R^2 for Greenville elections.) R^2 which was .88 and .81 in 1968 and 1970, respectively, dropped precipitously to .28 in 1974, far below the significance threshold of .5. Whereas social factors have been good predictors of election behavior in other state house elections, other factors must be doing the explaining in 1974. In 1974 the state legislative district, formerly an eleven member multi-member district, became an eleven member single-member district. This factor along with the increase of independent challengers may have hurt the Republican vote. Future elections will determine if the 1974 election was part of an overall trend of weakening class-based Republican support or an election deviating from an established pattern of stable, but relatively weak, class-based Republican vote.

Table 16. Greenville: R^2 for Elections, 1968-1974
(The Variables Racial Composition and Occupation
are Predicting Republican Voting)

Election Level	1968	1970	1972	1974
President	.83		.88	
Governor		.78		.76
State House	.88	.81		.28
County Council	.88	.79		.73

Class-based attachment to the Republican party is not especially

strong in either community. Republican votes, few as they may be in Richmond, tend to come from middle class whites. Greenville, with a strong Republican base, has votes coming from both classes though somewhat more from the middle class. Richmond may be moving back to a traditional Democratic monopoly whereas Greenville has moved toward partial realignment of middle class whites and some working class whites as well.

Partisan Alignments at the Local Level

Due to data limitations in Richmond, local elections were observed only in Greenville where Republicans have held a strong position on the county council since its inception in 1968. Interestingly enough, the relationship between social class and Republican voting, as reflected in the coefficients, is stronger for county council elections than for the state house elections; moreover, the relationship has remained stable over the six-year period under study and shows signs of increase in strength. Middle class whites tend to vote Republican in greater numbers than working class whites; this tendency has increased with time.

We have no data analysis for Richmond at the local level. What observations, if any, can we make about local political behavior and Republican strength in Richmond at the local level? First, it is possible that Republican voting patterns have developed at the local level in the suburban Richmond Henrico and Chesterfield Counties along the lines that we have seen in Greenville.¹⁰ Second, the absence of partisan elections in Richmond possibly has crippled the Republican party at the state house level making it more difficult to develop full organizational machinery just for that level.

¹⁰Although I was unable to use such data in this study, some data was available from County Board of Supervisor elections which suggests that this may be the case.

The developments in gubernatorial and national politics are largely independent of the political situations in individual communities; but local politics, even for state house elections, are directly related to the political and social status of the local party. Richmond is a middle class community (56.9%) with a large black working class population but with a relatively small white working class population. If turnout at the polls is an indicator, the voting strength of the middle class whites in Richmond is considerably stronger than the working class whites and blacks in most state house election years.¹¹ (See Table 17 for turnout coefficients in Richmond.) As a result, the middle class interests have been able to maintain control of the local Democratic party and its candidates; and blue collar interests, especially among whites, have little leverage within the Democratic party. Thus the local Democratic party has retained its appeal to middle class whites at the local state house level.

In Greenville the working class population, a high percentage of which is white, comprises a majority of the area's total population (54.5%). Despite the fact that middle class whites vote in greater proportions than working class whites or blacks, the working class population here has a much greater say in Greenville politics than in Richmond politics. (See Table 18 for turnout regressions in Greenville elections.) As a result, both parties have had to reckon, in Greenville, with two large population groups, middle class and working class whites, with little necessity of appealing to blacks who make up only 18.5% of the total population. Although middle class whites in Greenville tend to vote more

¹¹Turnout here refers to the percentage of registered voters who turnout out to vote.

Table 17. Richmond: Regression Coefficients for
Turnout and Social Class,
1960-1973

Election Level ^a	1960	1961	1964	1965	1968	1969	1972	1973
President	.43		.13		.11		.44	
Governor		.33		.61		.47		.51

^aTurnout for state house elections corresponds to turnout for governor since those elections fall in gubernatorial election years alternately. There are no records of turnout for the in-between state house elections. It might be noted that middle class turnout becomes relatively higher in gubernatorial elections than in presidential elections. It is quite possible that middle class turnout becomes proportionately higher, the further we move away from a national election.

Republican and working class whites tend to vote more Democratic at the local level, both parties have appealed to and gained sizable support from each group.

Table 18. Greenville: Regression Coefficients for Turnout and Social Class, 1968-1974

Election Level ^a	1968	1970	1972	1974
President	.18		.36	
Governor		.42		.27

^aTurnout for state house and local elections correspond to turnout for presidential and gubernatorial years since state house and local elections fall in every even year as do either the presidential or gubernatorial contest.

Convergence, Partisan Alignments, and Regression Analysis

The preceding regression analysis indicates that across-the-board convergence is not occurring in either Richmond or Greenville. Instead we find that different models of behavior characterize each electoral level and that the two communities, though dissimilar in social make-up, are responding similarly to politics at the presidential and gubernatorial levels and differ only at the more local levels. Convergence of a partial nature does appear to be occurring at the gubernatorial level and in Greenville for county council elections.

More significant is the evidence throughout the data that middle class whites tend to vote Republican to a greater extent than do working class whites; partisan realignment appears to be occurring among many middle class whites. Since occupation (social class) was formulated in

terms of middle class percentages rather than working class percentages, the regression analysis sheds more direct light on middle class than on working class electoral behavior. We can surmise, however, that working class whites are voting Republican on occasion, casting their ballots elsewhere on other occasions.

Middle Class Republicans, Working Class Democrats?

Social class and Republican voting have been discussed generally without extended discussion of differences in the behavior of the middle and working classes. Now we focus directly on the behavior of each group and the contribution each is making to the Republican and Democratic parties. According to the theory of convergence, the middle class should be supporting the Republican party; and the working class should be identifying primarily with the Democratic party. Is this indeed how they are behaving?

The Composition of Party Following

The regression coefficient used until now in the analysis is a single statistic which cannot easily focus directly on the behavior of an electoral subgroup in an election. In order to differentiate the electoral behavior of the middle and working classes more graphically than is possible with regression analysis and thus to sharpen analysis, we can estimate the composition of each party's following—that is, observe just what contribution each social group is making to the partisan division of the vote. This highlights and distinguishes the behavior of the middle class white population and the working class white population.

The contribution a population group makes to a party's total vote

is a function of its size, its turnout, and its loyalty to a given party. Only when all three components are accounted for can the actual contribution of a group be determined. Robert Axelrod has formulated a measure of contribution based on the following equation:¹²

$$\text{Contribution} = \frac{(\text{Size}) \times (\text{Turnout}) \times (\text{Loyalty})}{(\text{Community Turnout}) \times (\text{Community Loyalty})}$$

With the help of this formula, one can estimate the relative contributions of groups with differing turnouts, as well as the relative contributions of groups with differing degrees of loyalty to the major parties. Attempting thus to examine the social composition of the Democratic and Republican vote and the contribution that each social group has made to that party, the study classifies each precinct into two categories: white working class and white middle class. Each of these groups has

¹²Robert Axelrod, "Where the Vote Comes From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952-1968." American Political Science Review, 66 (March, 1972), 11-20. This equation holds where :

- 1) size of the group = $\frac{\text{adult members of group}}{\text{number in community}}$
- 2) turnout = $\frac{\text{voters in group}}{\text{adult members in group}}$
- 3) loyalty = $\frac{\text{voters for party in group}}{\text{voters in group}}$
- 4) contribution of a group to the electoral coalition of a party
= $\frac{\text{voters for party in group}}{\text{voters for party}}$

Note that the term turnout in Axelrod's formulation is different than turnout as used earlier. Here it is a percentage of total adult population instead of a percentage of registered voter population. While Axelrod used turnout as a percentage of total adult population, I have had to use turnout as a percentage of total population because of the way the data was formulated. This change reduces considerably the turnout percentage in the tables but does not appreciably change the level of party contribution according to a trial comparison made calculating turnout with total population figures and with adult population figures.

been examined to see if they are behaving in the anticipated manner.

Middle Class Whites

Are they Republican supporters? In both Greenville and Richmond middle class whites are apparently contributing the largest share of the Republican vote. (See Tables 19 and 20.) At all three levels in Richmond, the Republicans count on middle class whites for over two-thirds of their vote total; in Greenville this contribution comes closer to 50%. Except perhaps at the presidential level where Republicans had already made inroads among middle class whites in the early 1960's, middle class whites have made sharp shifts in their voting behavior from heavy or exclusive Democratic voting to varying degrees of Republican support. To generalize to other elections, middle class whites in these two communities are behaving much as we would anticipate. The one exception is at the state house level in Richmond where the Republicans have few supporters middle class or otherwise. True, two-thirds of what support they have comes from middle class whites, but only 29.3% of the middle class white electorate voted Republican in the election under study.

Have middle class whites changed partisan identification? Apparently, many middle class whites who would have considered only a Democratic vote choice in the past are now voting Republican. This finding confirms what was hypothesized in the regression analysis. Partisan realignment among middle class whites has occurred to varying degrees in both cities, and changes in partisan identification may indeed be occurring where changes in partisan choice become durable over time and over several electoral levels.

Republican realignment has been occurring among middle class

Table 19. Richmond: Electoral Characteristics of Middle Class Whites,
1960/1961 and 1972/1973 Elections

Election Level ^a	1960/1961				1972/1973			
	% of Popu- lation	Turn- out Rate	% Rep. Vote	% Dem. Vote	% Rep. Contri- bution	% Dem. Contri- bution	% Rep. Vote	% Dem. Vote
President	32.2%	34.5%	71.0%	29.0%	62.0%	38.9%	42.6%	48.9%
Governor	32.2	19.5	19.9	80.1	28.6	70.5	42.6	35.5
State House ^c	--	--	--	--	--	--	42.6	144.0 ^d
							29.3	52.9
							66.6	51.3

^aThe turnout rate recorded here is a function of total population instead of a percentage of registered voters or of adult population. This does not appreciably affect the party contribution figure. See footnote 9 in the text.

^bThis figure officially refers to Independent percentages rather than Democratic percentages; the Democratic candidate in the election ran under an Independent label. Because of the lack of other opposition to the Republican party and because of the special facts of the election, I feel that these figures reflect Democratic vote and contribution for the purposes of this study.

^cThere was no Republican opposition in this election in 1961.

^dAt the state house level votes exceed size of the group due to multi-member districts. Therefore, turnout is expressed as exceeding 1.0. It is best to think of turnout here as a proportion fitting into the formula rather than a meaningful percentage.

Table 20. Greenville: Electoral Characteristics of Middle Class Whites,
1960/1962 and 1970/1972 Elections

Election Level ^a	1960/1962 ^b		1970/1972			
	% of Popu- lation	Turn- out Rate	% Rep. Vote	% Dem. Vote	% Rep. Contri- bution	% Dem. Contri- bution
President	31.7%	33.9%	89.5%	10.5%	50.0%	25.2%
Governor	31.7	25.4	59.7	39.1	50.5	36.1
State House	31.7	281.0 ^c	55.8	44.2	53.6	37.1
County Council	31.7	281.0 ^c	58.6	41.4	57.1	36.6

^aThe turnout rate recorded here is a function of total population instead of a percentage of registered voters or of adult population. This does not appreciably affect the party contribution figure. See footnote 9 in the text.

^bThere was no Republican competition except at the presidential level where complete figures were unavailable.

^cAt the state house and county council levels votes exceed size of the group due to multi-member districts. Therefore, turnout is expressed as exceeding 1.0.

whites in Richmond at the presidential and gubernatorial levels but only to the most limited degree at the state house level. Are the middle class whites in Richmond clinging to traditional Democratic party identification but finding Democratic candidates put forward at the state and national level to their distaste, perhaps too "liberal"? Or do the middle class whites consider themselves Republican now, but vote Democratic at the state house level where candidates still represent their interests sufficiently? It is this kind of dilemma which survey research could answer better.

In Greenville, on the other hand, apparently a sizable proportion of Greenville's middle class whites have become Republican identifiers and are voting Republican at all electoral levels. This is not to say that all middle class whites are voting Republican and have changed identification (the percentages, except at the presidential level, are not overwhelming), but evidence is sufficient to suggest considerable shift in identification.

Working Class Voting Behavior: Democratic Supporters?

A first glance at Tables 21 and 22 illustrates the great difference in voting strength of working class whites in Greenville and in Richmond. The working class in Richmond contributes only 16.3% to 25% of the vote to either party where in Greenville the working class contributes between 40.1% and 50.1% of the party vote. Obviously the working class whites have much more electoral power in the Greenville area than in Richmond, and this fact undoubtedly influences the strategies of the two major parties.

Working class whites are behaving similarly in Richmond and Greenville at the presidential and gubernatorial levels. At both levels

Table 21. Richmond: Electoral Characteristics of Working Class Whites,
1960/1961 and 1972/1973 Elections

Election Level ^a	1960/1961					1972/1973				
	% of Popu- lation	Turn- out Rate	% Rep. Vote	% Dem. Vote	% Rep. Contri- bution	% of Popu- lation	Turn- out Rate	% Rep. Vote	% Dem. Vote	% Rep. Contri- bution
President	30.5%	16.4%	54.6%	45.4%	21.5%	27.4%	29.2%	77.4%	21.0%	25.0%
Governor	30.5	8.7	33.8	66.2	20.5	24.6	29.2	56.8	43.2	20.8
State House ^b	--	--	--	--	--	--	29.2	73.0 ^c	23.0	53.2
								18.2		17.9

^aThe turnout rate recorded here is a function of total population instead of a percentage of registered voters or of adult population. This does not appreciably affect the party contribution figure. See footnote 9 in the text.

^bThere was no Republican opposition in this election in 1961.

^cAt the state house level votes exceed size of the group due to multi-member districts. Therefore, turnout is expressed as exceeding 1.0. It is best to think of turnout here as a proportion fitting into a formula rather than a meaningful percentage.

Table 22. Greenville: Electoral Characteristics of Working Class Whites, 1960/1962 and 1970/1972 Elections

Election Level ^a	1960/1962 ^b				1970/1972			
	% of Population	Turnout Rate	% Rep. Vote	% Dem. Vote	% Rep. Contribution	% Dem. Contribution		
President	56.0%	20.1%	81.0%	19.0%	47.4%	47.7%		
Governor	56.0	16.1	50.0	48.3	47.3	50.0		
State House	56.0	168.0 ^c	43.4	56.6	44.0	50.1		
County Council	56.0	168.0 ^c	42.3	57.7	40.1	49.7		

^aThe turnout rate recorded here is a function of total population instead of a percentage of registered voters or of adult population. This does not appreciably affect the party contribution figure. See footnote 9 in the text.

^bThere was no Republican competition except at the presidential level where complete figures were unavailable.

^cAt the state house and county council levels votes exceed size of the group due to multi-member districts. Therefore, turnout is expressed as exceeding 1.0.

working class whites are voting Republican in greater numbers than Democratic although not as heavily as the middle class whites we have discussed earlier. This trend reverses for both communities at the state house level where the working class whites are voting Democratic in greater numbers as we would expect. This pattern sharpens further as we move to the county council level in Greenville where 57.7% of the working class whites voted Democratic and their contribution to the Democratic party is considerably higher than to the Republican party. Still, with the exception of the state house level in Richmond where the Republican appeal is low for all groups, the appeal of the Republican party has been substantial in both cities at all levels. Even at Greenville's lower electoral levels, 42% and 43% of the working class have voted Republican; and their contribution to the Republican party has exceeded 40%. This large Republican contribution on the part of the working class whites in Greenville represents an abrupt shift from the early 1960's when virtually no blue collar Republican voters existed.

At the local level in Greenville, casual observation indicates the emergence of two major factions in each party, one appealing to middle class interests, the other to working class interests. Each group is jockeying for control of their respective parties. In a recent city council election, the working class interests in the Republican primary prevailed only to be rejected by middle class voters in the general election. The strongest contribution to Republican voting at all levels comes from the middle class voters despite the size of the working class whites. If the Republicans allow working class interests to control the Republican party, the Republicans could lose their strong competitive position in Greenville.

The Influence of In-Migration on Middle Class
Republican Voting

The findings in this chapter indicate that many middle class whites in Greenville and Richmond have found a strong attraction to the Republican party. Some would question, however, the degree of shift in partisan identification among the middle class whites especially at the lower ticket levels as in Greenville. It has been sometimes alleged that population migration, largely involving middle class whites from outside the South, is responsible for a sizable share of the growth in Republican voting. Indeed, in recent years with increased industrialization in the South, many nonsouthern firms have moved into the South bringing nonsouthern personnel with them; these personnel and their families tend to be Republican in their partisan affiliation.¹³

Census figures for both Richmond and Greenville indicate that many people are indeed moving into these cities from outside but that they are moving from elsewhere in the state or from the South much more than from the West or North. For example, the figures for in-migration from outside the region in Greenville rarely exceed 10% for any precinct and generally are much lower. Even in-migration from anywhere outside the community exceeds one-third in only two cases with most of the precincts registering much lower figures even in relatively high mobility precincts. (See Table 23.) Still a brief analysis of the relationship between Republican voting and in-migration in the precincts might render helpful insights into the source of Republican voting behavior on the part of middle class whites.

¹³Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), suggest that this would be the case.

Table 23. Comparison of Precinct Ranks for In-Migration and Social Class in High and Low In-Migration Precincts (Based on 1970 Census Figures)

High In-Migration Precincts ^a			Low In-Migration Precincts ^b		
In-Migration Percentage	Rank	Social Class Rank ^c	In-Migration Percentage	Rank	Social Class Rank ^d
36.8%	1	1	5.8%	1	1
33.4	2	2	6.2	2	3
28.7	3	3	6.7	3	2
28.1	4	4	6.8	4	4
25.9	5	6	7.0	5	7
25.8	6	5	7.6	6	5
25.7	7	7	7.8	7	6
24.5	8	8	8.7	8	10
22.7	9	9	8.8	9	8
22.4	10	11	9.0	10	9

^aHigh in-migration precincts are those ten precincts with the highest in-migration percentages.

^bLow in-migration precincts are those ten precincts with the lowest in-migration percentages.

^cSocial class rank for high in-migration precincts represents middle class percentage rankings. Rank 1 belongs to the precinct with the highest middle class percentage.

^dSocial class rank for low in-migration precincts represents middle class percentage rankings. Rank 1 belongs to the precinct with the lowest middle class percentage.

A Methodological Note

Chapter III described the procedure by which social class was predicted for each precinct from social variables known at both the precinct and census tract levels. We attempted to predict, in the same manner, in-migration from outside the South (extraregional) and in-migration from outside the metropolitan areas (total in-migration). The precinct variables in neither city could predict extraregional in-migration satisfactorily, and only in the case of Greenville were those variables adequate predictors of total in-migration from outside the metropolitan area. (See Table 24.) This factor severely hampers an analysis of in-migration; however, since Republican partisanship has increased in Greenville at all electoral levels including state and local, perhaps the available figures can help explain the source of that increase.

Some difficulties in interpretation also arose for the regression coefficients for total in-migration and Republican voting. When the variable "in-migration" was added to the prediction equation used in this chapter, the results were negative regression coefficients for in-migration and positive correlation coefficients. Obviously, social class and/or race are affecting the in-migration value to produce negative regression coefficients. Unable to make adequate interpretation of these figures, the following analysis uses simple correlation coefficients, simple regression coefficients, and individual precincts with high and low in-migration patterns in order to make several comments concerning in-migration and Republican voting in Greenville.

Another important factor to note is the high intercorrelation, .99442, between social class and in-migration. A look at the precincts

Table 24. R^2 for Independent Variables, Race, Owner-Occupancy, Rent Values, and House Values, Explaining Dependent Variables Extraregional In-Migration and Total In-Migration

City and Census ^a	R^2 for Extraregional In-Migration ^b	R^2 for Total In-Migration ^c
Richmond, 1960 Census	.27	.41
Richmond, 1970 Census	.28	.33
Greenville, 1970 Census	.15	.59

^aAll variables were measured at census tract level.

^bExtraregional in-migration represents in-migration from outside the South.

^cTotal in-migration is all in-migration from outside the city's metropolitan area.

with the highest and lowest in-migration patterns indicates that they are almost identical in rank with those highest and lowest in social class ranking. (See Table 23.) The high correlation between social class and in-migration values in Greenville not only makes it more difficult to interpret migration's relationship to Republican voting but suggests that in-migration may be a significant contributor to the middle class percentage in Greenville.

In-Migration and Republican Voting in Greenville

All of the available indicators suggest that in-migration may be influencing the pattern of Republican voting in Greenville. It has already been mentioned that the relationship between social class and in-migration approaches 1.0 suggesting that the two cannot be separated and that the growth of the middle class in Greenville may be intimately related to in-migration, extraregional and total. R^2 for the simple correlation coefficients, r , indicate that in-migration alone can explain over 70% of the variation in Republican voting in the 1968 elections and close to that in county council elections. (See Table 25.)

The simple regression coefficients, the simple correlation coefficients, and an analysis of high and low in-migration precincts all suggest that increases in in-migration into precincts from anywhere outside the metropolitan area bring with them increases in Republican voting. (See Tables 25 and 26.) The analysis of those precincts with the highest and lowest in-migration percentages for the 1968 presidential election in Table 27 clearly show that those precincts with the highest in-migration register high Republican voting and those with the least in-migration register the lowest Republican vote. This observation holds

Table 25. Greenville: Simple Correlation Coefficients and r^2
for Total In-Migration and Republican Voting for
Elections, 1968-1974.

Election Level	1968		1970		1972		1974	
	r	r^2	r	r^2	r	r^2	r	r^2
President	.88	.77			.62	.38		
Governor			.71	.50			.77	.59
State House	.84	.71	.80	.64			.44	.19
County Council	.86	.74	.83	.69			.81	.66

for all the elections with R^2 in excess of .5 but is strongest for the 1968 presidential and local elections and for the county council elections of 1970 and 1974.

Table 26. Greenville: A Matrix of Simple Regression Coefficients for In-Migration and Republican Voting, 1968-1974

Election Level	1968	1970	1972	1974
President	2.23		1.73	
Governor		1.50		2.05
State House	1.67	1.53		1.01
County Council	1.84	1.69		1.73

Concluding Statements

The data indicate that in-migration may have affected the growth of Republican voting, especially in local elections and in the late sixties. Nonetheless, since the correlation of in-migration with social class is extremely strong, as indicated by the intercorrelation values, and a distinction between nonsouthern and southern in-migration was not possible for the available data, interpretation of the regression coefficients is difficult. We are unable to discuss the effects of in-migration further with any degree of confidence.

What should be said is that in-migration undoubtedly contributes to the association between social class and Republican voting and may reduce, though not eliminate, the likelihood of partisanship change among middle class whites in Greenville. The primary component of in-migration is southerners rather than nonsoutherners in most cases;

Table 27. Greenville: In-Migration and Republican Voting in High and Low In-Migration Precincts, in 1968 Presidential Election
(Based on 1970 Census Figures)

High In-Migration Precincts ^a				Low In-Migration Precincts ^b			
In-Migration Percentage	Rank ^c	Republican Vote Percentage	Rank	In-Migration Percentage	Rank	Republican Vote Percentage	Rank
36.8%	1	78.3%	3	5.8%	1	37.0%	8
33.4	2	80.1	1	6.2	2	30.3	1
28.1	4	78.5	2	6.7	3	33.5	4
25.9	5	64.7	10	6.8	4	31.9	3
25.7	7	72.5	6	7.6	6	37.2	9
24.5	8	67.4	8	7.8	7	30.7	2
22.4	10	62.8	--	8.7	8	39.3	10
21.0	12	74.2	5	9.0	10	36.2	6

^aFor high in-migration precincts, in-migration and the Republican vote are ranked from highest percentages down.

^bFor low in-migration precincts, in-migration and the Republican vote are ranked from the lowest percentages up. Rank 1 thus belongs to that precinct with the lowest in-migration percentage or lowest Republican vote.

^cMissing ranks for in-migration are due to missing information in vote returns for the election.

even so total in-migration whether from outside the South or inside accounts for well under a third of precinct population in all but two precincts. The level of Republican voting in all of the high mobility precincts substantially exceeds in-migration rate for most elections concerned. These two factors suggest that outsiders have augmented the Republican vote, but they do not adequately explain it. Social class remains not only the more significant factor, but one that was readily interpretable in the data, unlike in-migration.

Concluding Remarks

While evidence suggests that class-based Republican voting is occurring in some elections, such as the 1968 presidential election, the gubernatorial elections in both cities, or the local elections in Greenville, predictions of partisan convergence in these two communities must necessarily be restrained. Unquestionably, the electoral behavior in these two cities more closely approximates that behavior associated with nonsouthern norms than was the case in the early sixties. Apparently, southerners who would never have considered such a choice 15 or 20 years ago are now voting Republican at all levels. Middle class white southerners, particularly, have felt a strong attraction to the Republican party at all levels in both cities except perhaps at the state house level in Richmond. This is what we expect of class-based voting. But a more interesting finding is that many working class whites have felt the pull of Republicanism as well--though not as consistently or as strongly as middle class whites.

Where class-based Republican voting is not occurring, where working class as well as middle class whites are voting Republican, can

we say that racial composition of a precinct helps explain the voting pattern? That is, are racial factors as well as social class factors explaining the Republican vote? It is quite possible that the importance of the racial issue which has distinguished southern politics in the past continues to make southern politics distinctive today. At this point now, I must consider the racial factor and Republican voting; but also I must consider the area of independent voting, a voting pattern frequently associated with racial motivation.

CHAPTER V

DISTINCTIVE REALIGNMENT AND THE RACIAL ISSUE

Convergence fails to explain fully voting behavior in Richmond and Greenville, especially among the working class whites. Perhaps instead of converging in politics with the rest of the nation, these two communities are developing patterns which maintain distinctively southern patterns of political behavior, a possibility I have termed "distinctive realignment." The racial issue, traditionally an organizing principle behind southern partisanship, is likely to be important in any new partisan alignment in the South; its continued contribution needs to be studied to ascertain the nature of its influence on southern partisan politics. Before drawing any conclusions about distinctive realignment and the continued influence of the racial issue on southern partisanship, we must review the racial issue in its historical perspective and in its electoral expressions.

Historical Perspective: Race and the Breakdown of the Traditionally Democratic South

Historically, racial policy formed the binding force between the South and the Democratic party from the post-civil war period until the middle of the twentieth century. The liaison between the South and the Democratic party allowed the region to develop its own brand of racial politics as long as the South supported the Democratic party at the national level.

The New Deal Realignment

With the occurrence of the Great Depression in 1929, the situation began to change. The two national parties severely split in their reaction to that cataclysmic event--the Republicans reacting more cautiously and conservatively, the Democrats under Roosevelt reacting with decided activism. This split in party reaction crosscut the traditional following of each party provoking the realignment of party support we have discussed as the New Deal realignment. In the North the working class, the ethnics, and the blacks, those groups with the greatest stake in an activist governmental approach to economic recovery, came to support the Democratic party. Those groups, mostly affluent, middle class whites, who were more conservative in their desire for large-scale government action turned to the Republican party.¹

In the South as the country polarized around the issues of the New Deal, many southern Democrats found themselves at the anti-New Deal political pole and discovered themselves most uncomfortable in the party of Franklin Roosevelt. The political activism and growth of government function under the New Deal Democratic administration violated the political, economic, and governmental conservatism typical of many southerners; but the barriers to partisan change were stronger in the South than elsewhere, and the traditional lines in the South held throughout the Roosevelt years.

In 1948, however, Harry Truman forced the break between the South and the Democratic party; in February of that year he sent the first civil

¹See James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), Chapters 10-12, for discussion, in full, of the New Deal realignment.

rights proposals to Congress foreshadowing legislation enacted in the 1950's and 1960's. The result was the Dixiecrat Revolt of 1948. South Carolina native son Strom Thurmond led the States' Rights protest into the presidential election, carried four Deep South states, and polled well in other areas of the South.

The Fifties and Sixties and Change in the South

In 1952 the independent protest movement subsided, and the Republican party experienced its first real surge in southern support since the New Deal realignment. In this election Republican support in the South came from two major sources, from the metropolitan centers of the Border South and from Dixiecrat black-belt counties.²

The metropolitan Republican votes were drawn primarily from the more affluent areas of these centers and seemed to reflect a political reaction related directly to New Deal economic issues by those most conservative in attitude toward economic activism. This Republicanism which appeared so decisively in 1952 has proved to be solid and durable at the presidential level and is extending slowly to lower levels.

The reaction of the Dixiecrat black-belt counties in 1952 and after has been anything but stable. According to Sundquist, these counties have, with regularity since 1952, moved in the opposite direction from those of the Border metropolitan centers and of the nation. They were disillusioned with Eisenhower in 1956 (voting for a States' Rights ticket where one was available, otherwise swinging to Stevenson). They

²The black-belt counties traditionally refer to those counties throughout the South, but primarily in the Deep South, where the dirt was rich black, where the cotton economy thrived, and where black slaves were located in largest numbers. Today, the black-belt refers to those areas of the South where the concentration of blacks is the greatest.

turned down Kennedy in 1960, turned out enthusiastically for Goldwater in 1964, but rejected Nixon in 1968 in favor of Wallace. These voters lost their moorings in national politics in the postwar period and represent a protest vote motivated by racial attitudes.³

Class and Racial Voting in the South

Although the historical perspective suggests a Border South-Deep South difference in Republican support over the last twenty years, underlying also is the class difference in Republican voters brought out in the previous chapter on class-based voting. According to study findings, both working class and middle class whites are voting Republican, especially at the presidential level; but the middle class whites are voting Republican with some stability and consistency whereas working class whites are voting Republican only sporadically.

Republican support in the South by both middle and working class whites has been confirmed by current realignment literature as well as by this study's findings.⁴ Indeed the current literature suggests that the working class Republican voter may be part of a protest pattern which is racially motivated in nature. Samuel Lubell in his book, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics, interviewed numerous working class southerners including a large number in Richmond. He identifies a protest voice among those working class whites who feel threatened by the residential and job mobility of blacks and many of whom are for the first time moving up the

³See Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, pp. 255 and 260, for comparison of political behavior in Border and Deep South communities.

⁴See Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, and Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970).

economic ladder themselves ("rednecks-on-the-move").⁵ Many of these people have voted Republican, then Independent, then Republican again in national politics. Lubell definitely links the voting habits of these working class southerners with racially motivated behavior.

According to this study's findings thus far as well as current outside research, the middle class whites represent a relatively stable element of the electorate, tending to vote Republican with some consistency; the working class whites, in contrast, represent an unstable fluctuating element of the electorate. If this is indeed the case, then it is this working class white group which may continue to make southern politics distinctive and on which the ensuing discussion must focus. This is not to say that racially motivated partisanship is confined to southern working class whites. It does suggest that racial motivation may more clearly influence the voting behavior of many working class whites whereas economic considerations tend to dominate the political choices of many middle class whites.

What Is Racially Motivated Electoral Behavior?

In much of this chapter, we will be discussing expressions of racially motivated behavior at the polls. Such behavior rests on the assumption that people vote in accord with their basic personal interests. Chapter IV suggests that many middle class white southerners have begun to vote, especially at the presidential level, in tune with middle class economic interests. It is the contention here that many working class whites vote, not according to working class economic interests, but in accord with racially conservative attitudes and perceptions. In other

⁵Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics, Chapter 5.

words, in elections where differences in the racial outlook of the candidates are perceived, these blue collar whites will vote for that candidate whose stand on campaign issues most closely fits their own conservative racial views rather than for that candidate who best represents their economic interests. In the absence of survey data for Richmond and Greenville linking voting behavior directly to racial attitudes, we must view racially motivated voting behavior solely in terms of specific voting patterns which would appear to have racial links.

For example, traditionally, the Democratic party has best represented the economic interests of the working class; but also it has supported black demands for inclusion in American society. Large numbers of working class whites appear to have foresaken the working class party either for the Republicans, never the champions of working class interests, or for independent movements, often the explicit champions of racial conservatism. This pattern suggests two ways in which racially motivated electoral behavior might be expressed in the present data.

Examples of Racially Motivated Electoral Behavior in the Data

Racially motivated electoral behavior might express itself in two ways. First, the working class "rednecks-on-the-move," to borrow Lubell's term, might join the middle class metropolitan Republicans to form an uneasy black-white partisan coalition. Most whites would be supporting the Republicans, and blacks as well as a few white liberal activists would support the Democratic party. In a sense if this pattern became widespread, it would signal a return to the pre-New Deal political status in the South. Instead of the Democratic party holding sway in the South, however, it would be the Republican party. The racial overtones of a black-white partisan alignment should be obvious.

A second pattern that we might see in the data would be this same working class "redneck-on-the-move" withdrawing his electoral support from the two major parties and giving support instead to a third party or independent movement. At the national level especially, the strongest independent movements since the forties have been intimately tied to racial conservatism.

If we are to determine the extent of racially motivated electoral behavior in the South, we must consider each of these alternatives and ask the following two questions. To what extent can we perceive these patterns to exist in the available data? To what extent can we determine that the working class white is responsible for these patterns?

Black-White Realignment

Distinctive realignment could develop in the South through a marriage of metropolitan Republican middle class whites and working class white "rednecks-on-the-move." In such cases the Republican party would dominate as the Democratic party once did, and the Democratic party would shrink to little more than a hard core of liberal integrationists and black supporters.

The stability of a coalition between middle and working class whites over any period of time is questionable. The two elements of Republican support are incompatible in many ways. The working class "rednecks-on-the-move" seem to represent the most racially conservative elements of southern society. The metropolitan suburban Republicans, having their base in the upper income, more highly educated strata, are more insulated from the blacks in housing and job competition and tend

to have not only more divergent economic interests but also more liberal attitudes on race.

Measures of Black-White Realignment in the Data

Probing black-white realignment in Richmond and Greenville necessitates using all the data examined in the previous chapters--regression coefficients for social class and Republican voting, vote returns, composition of party following--as well as regression coefficients for racial composition and Republican voting.

A black versus white alignment assumes that most whites are voting Republican, and blacks and a few whites are voting Democratic. As a measure of differentiation in black and white voting patterns, the regression coefficients for racial composition and Republican voting should provide the primary evidence of the extent to which this kind of alignment has occurred in our two cities.⁶ When the regression coefficients in our data approach 0, we can make no distinction between black and white voting patterns and thus we must assume that either the degree of Republican voting in the election is low altogether or blacks as well as whites are voting Republican. As the values of the regression coefficients increase, we can infer that black and white voting patterns are beginning to differ; the white Republican vote is increasing, primarily we presume, among the white middle class. The greater the value of the regression coefficients in the data, the more evidence we have of the occurrence of a black versus

⁶Note that the regression coefficients for racial composition and Republican voting are negative. The variable "racial composition" was formulated as the percentage of black population in each precinct. Thus, as the black percentage in a precinct increases, we would expect Republican voting to decrease; as black percentage in a precinct decreases, we would expect Republican voting to increase. The negative sign of the regression coefficients reflects this inverse relationship.

white voting alignment in electoral behavior. The greater the differentiation in white and black voting behavior, as reflected in increasing regression values, the more certain we are that working class and middle class whites are voting Republican in a white versus black alignment. Of course, one must use the social class coefficients and party composition data to confirm the electoral behavior of working class and middle class whites.

In order to determine the contribution of the working class to a black-white alignment, we would turn again to the regression coefficients for social class and Republican voting. In elections where the regression coefficients indicate that black versus white alignments are occurring, we would expect the coefficients to be low. That is, if both working class and middle class whites are voting Republican, we would expect the strong tendency of middle class whites to vote Republican, as indicated in Chapter IV, would be diluted by the influx of working class white voters. To verify this interpretation of the regression coefficients, it is possible to isolate the voting behavior of specific precincts in significant elections. We can observe the degree of Republican voting found in those white precincts (more than 75% white) which are most highly middle class or most highly working class in their composition and compare the two for each election and for each community. In this way we could see if working class whites are joining middle class Republican voters in large numbers in specific elections. It might also be helpful to refer back to Tables 21 and 22 in Chapter IV concerning the working class contribution in several elections.

Black-White Realignment at the Presidential Level

The regression coefficients for racial composition and Republican voting for both cities are remarkably similar at the presidential level; yet they reveal that a black versus white realignment is not occurring in either city. (See Tables 28 and 29.) Our discussion of the 1968 election in the last chapter indicated a large degree of class-based, not black versus white Republican voting behavior. Middle class whites tended to vote Republican in the election while working class whites, as later discussion will uncover, voted for George Wallace, the Independent candidate.

Table 28. Richmond: Matrix of Regression Coefficients
for Racial Composition and Republican Voting,
1960-1973

Election Level	1960	1961	1964	1965	1968	1969	1972	1973
President	-.06		-.52		-.31		-.70	
Governor		.78		.04		.08		-.42
State House		--		.001		-.09		.008

The 1972 presidential election and black-white alignment. Class-based voting disappears in 1972, however, and here we find a clear example of the black versus white voting alignment. The regression coefficients for racial composition register at or near $-.70$ for both cities, the highest coefficients for any election in the data, suggesting that most whites in this election are voting Republican while virtually all blacks are voting Democratic. The regression coefficients for social class confirm the assertion that working class whites as well as middle class whites are voting Republican in 1972. (See Chapter IV, Tables 13 and 14.)

Table 29. Greenville: Matrix of Regression Coefficients
for Racial Composition and Republican Voting,
1968-1974

Election Level	1968	1970	1972	1974
President	-.20		-.69	
Governor		-.40		-.37
State House	-.31	-.29		-.28
County Council	-.28	-.24		-.18

A comparison of the most heavily working class and most heavily middle class precincts in both cities confirms the last observation in large measure for the 1972 election. (See Tables 30-33.) For each city the ten most middle class and ten most working class precincts have been compared. The middle class precincts in both communities indicate that the vast majority of middle class whites are voting Republican. In the working class precincts (note that the class variable was measured in terms of middle class percentage and therefore we have used those precincts with the lowest middle class percentages) the degree of Republican voting has dropped. However, even if all the middle class whites living in these working class precincts are voting Republican, the differential between that middle class population and the Republican vote is substantial in most cases indicating that many working class whites, though by no means all, are voting Republican in this election. This is particularly clear in Greenville. These figures indicate, for those precincts which isolate the class factor best, that many working class whites did vote Republican and join middle class white Republican voters.

Table 30. Richmond: Republican Voting in Working Class
Precincts, 1972 Presidential Election
(Ten Precincts with Lowest
Middle Class Percentage)

Rank	% Middle Class	% Republican Vote
1	34.3%	56.6%
2	43.9	55.2
3	45.8	74.0
4	47.8	71.3
5	50.3	66.9
6	52.3	87.8
7	52.9	78.8
8	53.1	90.3
9	53.3	78.6
10	53.6	87.1

Table 31. Richmond: Republican Voting in Middle Class
Precincts, 1972 Presidential Election
(Ten Precincts with Highest
Middle Class Percentages)

Rank	⁶¹ / ₁₀ Middle Class	⁶¹ / ₁₀ Republican Vote
1	96.3%	90.5%
2	91.1	91.0
3	84.2	88.8
4	83.6	87.7
5	81.8	83.9
6	81.3	88.0
7	79.0	87.3
8	79.0	83.9
9	78.5	89.3
10	78.4	87.4

Table 32. Greenville: Republican Voting in Working Class
Precincts, 1972 Presidential Election
(Ten Precincts with Lowest
Middle Class Percentage)

Rank	% Middle Class	% Republican Vote
1	21.4%	59.9%
2	21.8	68.0
3	24.2	67.0
4	25.0	75.4
5	25.3	74.6
6	25.4	80.3
7	26.5	65.1
8	27.1	85.5
9	29.0	82.4
10	29.3	80.6

Table 33. Greenville: Republican Voting in Middle Class
Precincts, 1972 Presidential Election
(Ten Precincts with Highest
Middle Class Percentages)

Rank	% Middle Class	% Republican Vote
1	98.6%	88.1%
2	84.2	87.6
3	78.0	85.5
4	78.0	88.1
5	70.6	90.6
6	67.6	87.0
7	66.3	88.9
8	65.3	82.8
9	63.9	77.2
10	60.7	81.9

Black-white realignments in earlier Richmond elections. Earlier presidential voting in Richmond, for which data is not available in Greenville, reveals that blacks and whites voted in similar ways in 1960 despite a high Republican vote of 60.4%⁷ but that something of a black-white pattern occurred in the 1964 election where Goldwater was the candidate. Although 43.2% of the Richmond electorate voted for Goldwater, the coefficient for racial composition is at a moderately high -.52. Still the election tended to break somewhat on class lines with the social class coefficient standing at a moderate .48. We can surmise in Greenville, where 62.3% of the electorate voted Republican and where the blue collar percentage is higher than in Richmond, that we would have seen a stronger instance of black versus white voting.

Black-white alignment of the electorate has occurred only in isolated presidential elections, not every four years. Apparently, working class whites are joining middle class white Republicans only when the Republican party represents the most conservative presidential alternative on racial issues. Goldwater made direct appeals to the southern racial conservative in 1964, to his national detriment; and Nixon refused to take an active stand on busing in 1972.

Differing Patterns at the Gubernatorial Level

Richmond and Greenville may resemble one another with regard to racially motivated voting at the presidential level, but their patterns

⁷Evidence indicates that blacks in Richmond voted Republican in the 1950's and early 1960's. This was strikingly the case in the 1961 gubernatorial election as indicated in Table 28. The coefficient for the 1960 presidential election suggests that while some blacks were perhaps switching their support to the Democratic party many held onto their Republican allegiance. In the same election whites were dividing their votes between the Democratic and Republican candidates. With the divided partisan allegiance of blacks and whites, we can explain the near 0 regression coefficients in the data.

are divergent at the gubernatorial level as indicated in Tables 28 and 29. At the gubernatorial level Richmond and Greenville differ substantially in the pattern of their regression coefficients, both for social class and for racial composition.

In Richmond, despite an increasing degree of Republican voting in the 1965 and 1969 gubernatorial elections, blacks and whites are still voting very much alike. A sharp differentiation in racial voting appears in 1973 but is accompanied by a high degree of class-based voting. Richmond, instead of developing a white versus black electoral pattern, appears to be developing a converging pattern as discussed in the previous chapter. In Richmond Republicans are slowly making headway at the gubernatorial level but not along the lines of a black-white alignment.

The analysis varies somewhat for Greenville. In both 1970 and 1974 blacks and whites differ substantially in their voting behavior, not as much as in the 1972 election but more than in the 1968 presidential contest. In 1970, particularly, the class-based nature of this election is low with the suggestion that working class whites as well as middle class whites were voting Republican.

A comparison of the 1969/1970 gubernatorial elections: Richmond.
A comparison of the 1969 gubernatorial election in Richmond and the 1970 gubernatorial election in Greenville might tell us more about basic differences in the voting behavior of each city. Richmond in 1969 provided a 63.6% plurality for Linwood Holton, the first Republican governor in Virginia since Reconstruction. Republicans accomplished this feat primarily because they wooed and won (according to the regression coefficients for racial composition) a substantial proportion of the black vote. The

Republicans did not retain the black vote in 1973, nor did that election fall into a black versus white pattern. Instead, Republicans achieved a more familiar class-based voting coalition. In neither election were the Republicans appealing to the racially conservative elements of the electorate. A black-white alignment at this level is still out of the question in Richmond.

A comparison of the 1969/1970 gubernatorial elections: Greenville.

The political scene in South Carolina in 1970 presents a very different picture. There Republican strategists surmised that a Wallace-type campaign along racial lines would enable the party to put together the 1968 statewide Nixon vote (38%) and the statewide Wallace vote (32%) for an unbeatable majority.⁸ The intended Republican coalition did not materialize, and Albert Watson, the Republican candidate, received only 46% of the statewide vote. In Greenville Watson won 51.4% of the 1970 vote. This does not approach the Nixon-Wallace combined total of 75% in 1968 (with Wallace capturing 22.9% of the vote, much less than the statewide total); but the regression coefficients for social class indicate that many of the working class whites, probably Wallace supporters, did give their vote to Republican Watson.

A comparison of heavily middle class and heavily working class white precincts highlights the behavior of both social classes in the 1970 gubernatorial election and reveals an interesting pattern not evident in the regression coefficients. (See Tables 34 and 35.) The middle class precincts are voting Republican in greater percentages than are the heavily working class precincts. Yet the Republican share of the vote in the

⁸Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, p. 363.

Table 34. Greenville: Republican Voting in Working Class
Precincts, 1970 Gubernatorial Election
(Precincts with Lowest Middle
Class Percentages)

Rank	% Middle Class	% Republican Vote
1	21.4%	31.7%
2	21.8	31.8
3	24.2	39.2
4	25.0	57.0
5	25.3	36.0
6	25.4	27.9
7	26.5	37.5
8	27.1	44.8
9	29.0	41.1
10	29.3	46.8
11	29.3	50.5
12	29.3	37.5

Table 35. Greenville: Republican Voting in Middle Class
Precincts, 1970 Gubernatorial Election
(Ten Precincts with Highest
Middle Class Percentages)

Rank	% Middle Class	% Republican Vote
1	98.6%	58.1%
2	84.2	59.6
3	78.0	60.8
4	78.0	55.1
5	70.6	54.1
6	67.6	59.5
7	66.3	62.2
8	65.3	59.0
9	63.9	68.7
10	60.7	64.8

middle class precincts is well below the middle class percentage indicating that there are many middle class whites who were voting Democratic and not Republican in this election (there was no substantial independent vote in this election). On the other hand, in the heavily working class precincts (i. e., those precincts with the lowest middle class percentages) there are more Republican voters than middle class whites living in those working class precincts. The data suggest that a sizable working class group is voting Republican in this election. Evidence in Table 22, Chapter IV, would confirm this finding.

The degree of racially motivated electoral behavior seemed reduced by 1974--the regression coefficients for social class having increased substantially. Still racially motivated Republican voting at the gubernatorial level is certainly not a dead issue in Greenville.

Differing Patterns at the State-Local Level

The regression coefficients for racial composition reveal substantial differences between Richmond and Greenville at the state-local level. Vote returns in Richmond reveal that the Republican party has never obtained a foothold in state house elections; thus, low regression coefficients for racial composition tell us that few voters are supporting the Republican candidates and therefore that whites as well as blacks are voting Democratic at this level.

In Greenville the regression coefficients as well as election returns suggest that the Republicans have gained a substantial foothold at the state house and county council levels. The coefficients for racial composition, however, are not as high as at the gubernatorial level nor as high as the 1972 presidential election; and the coefficients for social

class are of moderate strength indicating some class-based explanation for the Republican voting. A review of the data concerning social composition of the major parties (see Chapter IV, Tables 19-22) reveals that working class whites are voting Republican as well as Democratic in large numbers and that middle class whites as well as working class whites are voting Democratic to some degree. The data do not support the development of a black versus white partisan alignment in Greenville but rather the development of factionalized parties each with an uneasy coalition of the two major class divisions. Inherently, these coalitions must be unstable. Observation of recent elections indicates strong efforts on the part of working class elements to gain control of the Republican party, especially in the primary, but at the loss of middle class support in the general election.

Why has Greenville developed a competitive two party system, with middle class and working class whites struggling for control of each party, rather than realigning along white-black lines as has occurred in some areas of the Deep South? One possibility is the extremely low percentage of blacks in Greenville, only 18.5%. Thus, the degree of racial tension may be lower than in many areas of the South and not enough to force some whites from their Democratic mooring. Perhaps, the blacks, due to their relatively small numbers, have failed to organize sufficiently and have failed to command a voice within the Democratic party leaving both parties free to direct their appeal to working class and middle class white factions both of which make up a sizable proportion of the electorate. Perhaps, the in-migration pattern in Greenville and the economic development of the local citizenry have been sufficient to provide a Republican middle class core strong enough to reject a black versus white alignment.

In any case, Greenville has not succumbed to the strictly white versus black alignment that has occurred elsewhere in the Deep South nor has it entirely warded off symptoms of race-oriented voting behavior. Greenville seems to be experiencing a modified form of black-white alignment at the local level. Blacks appear to have little power in either party, and each party at the local level is developing an alliance of middle and working class whites.

Concluding Remarks

Black-white alignment is not the prevailing pattern at any level in either city. The clearest expression of this kind of alignment occurred during the 1972 presidential election, but evidence of such an alignment exists also for the 1970 gubernatorial election in Greenville. In the cases where black versus white voting alignments appear, regression coefficients for social class and Republican voting indicate that working class whites are indeed responsible for the voting pattern.

Independent Voting and the Third-Party Movement

While working class whites have sometimes joined middle class whites in Republican voting, bringing about a distinctly white versus black division of the vote, as we observed in the 1964 and 1972 presidential elections, racially motivated electoral behavior has occurred frequently through independent presidential voting as well. In the years since 1948, whenever a third-party candidate (or a slate of independent electors) ran on a platform tailored for the white voters in the black-belt, these voters deserted the Republican party as readily as they had rejected the Democratic party in 1948.⁹

⁹Ibid., p. 261.

The voters of Greenville have seemed somewhat more inclined to vote independent than those of Richmond. Native son Strom Thurmond collected 61.6% of the county vote for the Dixiecrats in 1948. Independent Electors for Harry Byrd in 1956 garnered 16.7% of the total vote of Greenville County. And in 1968 George Wallace polled 22.9% of the county vote. Richmond contributed no substantial vote for Thurmond or Byrd and cast 17.2% of its votes for Wallace in 1968. A segment of the Greenville electorate has been a likely source for independent movements, although the size of the Wallace vote is not as high as one might expect in a Deep South city with a sizable blue collar population. Perhaps many of these people have accepted Republican candidates as sufficiently conservative. Richmond voters have succumbed to independent voting at the presidential level only once, but the Wallace vote does suggest a sizable protest element.

George Wallace and the 1968 Election

The southern protest movement grew throughout the fifties and sixties, spurred by the Supreme Court's school integration decision, civil rights agitation, demonstrations, violence, and the civil rights legislative battles. In 1968 George Wallace ran as presidential candidate for the American Independent Party (AIP) in all fifty states, won 9.9 million votes (eight times that of the Thurmond total), and carried five states of the Deep South. Not all of Wallace's support in that election may have come from racially motivated sources; but Wallace undoubtedly was perceived as the country's leading die-hard segregationist. It is unlikely that many who rejected his racial views gave him their vote on other grounds. Virtually no one supported him in all-black precincts.¹⁰

¹⁰Ibid., p. 357.

Tables 36 and 37 illustrate two characteristics of the Wallace movement in Richmond and Greenville. First, and obviously, Wallace voters are white. Coefficients for racial composition confirm this fact. A glance at the data indicates few, if any, votes for Wallace in all-black precincts. Second, Wallace supporters tend to come from the working class. The regression coefficients for social class for both communities are negative. That is, as precinct middle class percentage increases, independent voting decreases. Put another way, as the percentage of middle class whites decreases in a precinct and thus the percentage of working class whites increases, so does the degree of independent voting. Moreover, the regression coefficients for social class are moderately high. There is no mistaking the fact that the working class voter is responsible for protest voting. By this measure we might conclude that the working class whites do indeed comprise the most racially conservative element of the southern electorate.

Table 36. Richmond: Regression Coefficients for Social Class and Independent Voting and for Racial Composition and Independent Voting

Election Level ^a	Social Class and Independent Voting	Racial Composition and Independent Voting
1965, Governor	-.16	-.27
1968, President	-.68	-.42
1973, State House	-.32	-.29

^aData are given for those elections where the independent vote was sizable.

Richmond and Greenville resemble one another in their pattern of Wallace voting for both types of regression coefficients. Greenville voters supported Wallace by a slightly larger percentage of the vote. The vote differential between the two communities was small considering the relatively large voting power of the working class in Greenville.

Table 37. Greenville: Regression Coefficients for Social Class and Independent Voting and for Racial Composition and Independent Voting

Election Level ^a	Social Class	Racial Composition
	and Independent Voting	and Independent Voting
1968, President	-.58	-.54
1974, State House	-.10	-.10

^aData are given for those elections where the independent vote was sizable.

Wallace and the Independent Movement: The 1972 Presidential Election

The Wallace movement does not appear to be replacing one of the two major parties. After the Democratic convention of 1972, Wallace declined to run again as a third-party candidate partially, no doubt, because of his disability from the attempt on his life. The independent movement could find no other candidate of his stature with similar views to rally around and who could attract voter support. No doubt most of Wallace's supporters in 1972 voted for Richard Nixon, but there is no reason to believe that they have come to identify themselves as Republicans since the Republicans have declined to identify with their issue.

The Independent Movement at Lower Levels

The independent movement has failed to attain major party status and supplant one of the major existing parties, nor has it succeeded in capturing control of either of the two major parties. Moreover, it has failed to raise much interest at lower levels at least in the two cities under observation. The two major parties must be perceived as adequately expressing the interests represented by the independent movement.

Independent candidates in Greenville have garnered no more than 6.3% of the vote, and that percentage was in the 1974 state house election. In that election the largest share of the independent vote came from one precinct, that where Bob Jones University, a fundamentalist conservative school, is located and where most of its faculty and students live.

In Richmond independent movements have had greater appeal than in Greenville below the presidential level, but they have represented diverse points of view in addition to the racially conservative pattern under focus here. Interestingly enough, two of the independent drives, those for state house in 1961 and in 1969, were in behalf of blacks or black candidates. The 1965 Conservative party candidacy must have appealed to many middle class whites as well as working class whites since the regression coefficients for social class and independent voting are low. (See Table 36.) Only in 1973 at the state house level has there been an independent movement similar in nature to the national independent movement; here the independents gathered 16.3% of the vote, and the pattern of coefficients resembled those of the 1968 Wallace vote. (See Table 36.)

Concluding Remarks

Like the black versus white alignment, racially motivated independent voting has had its clearest expression at the presidential level,

particularly in the 1968 presidential election, with George Wallace as its primary spokesman. In this election the working class white was obviously the independent movement's strongest supporter. The independent movement does not appear to be replacing one of the two major parties at the presidential level, nor has it evoked much enthusiasm at lower electoral levels; it remains primarily a racially motivated, working class supported protest movement.

Richmond and Greenville as Different Urban Electorates

Richmond and Greenville have been discussed and compared in this chapter in terms of their patterns of racially motivated electoral behavior. In searching for possible explanations for differences in electoral patterns in these two cities, the analysis has thus far relied on social class and race. It should be recalled that some scholars, particularly Sundquist, have also noted geographic differences in electoral behavior between the Border and Deep South. Richmond is a metropolitan center in a Border South state whereas Greenville is located in a traditionally Deep South state. Can these differing geographic locations help us understand urban differences in racially motivated electoral behavior? It is my contention that a closer analysis of the data at all levels will reveal that Richmond is typical of Border state metropolitan centers whereas Greenville represents a variant of Deep South electoral behavior.

The Presidential Level

The regression coefficients for racial composition and Republican voting reveal no major differences at the presidential level between the two cities with the data available; a review of the percentage vote returns for the fifties, sixties, and seventies for both cities, however,

indicate differing patterns. These differing patterns take clearer focus when put in graph form as in Figure 2. James Sundquist noted that many Deep South communities, especially in the black-belt areas, moved with regularity since 1952 in the opposite direction from those of the Border metropolitan centers and of the nation.¹¹ Richmond, one of the Border cities Sundquist used in his comparison, follows the general national voting patterns at the presidential level (although voting slightly more Republican than the nation). In contrast, Greenville's electoral behavior fluctuates in a manner similar to that described by Sundquist (though not as extremely). The modification of the pattern may result from Greenville's relatively low black population; though it may be in the Deep South, Greenville is not in the heavily black-belt area of the Deep South.

The Gubernatorial Level

Racially motivated electoral differences between Richmond and Greenville are more subtle at the gubernatorial level. In Richmond we have seen a developing convergence pattern with the Republicans making slow headway; black-white alignment in any form is out of the question. In Greenville the electoral pattern has see-sawed between a suggestion of black versus white alignment and a class-based pattern. Racially motivated Republican voting at the gubernatorial level has not ceased to be an issue in Greenville.

Differing Patterns at the State-Local Level

Distinctly different electoral patterns emerge at the state-local level between the two communities which may be related to Deep South-Border South differences in location. Sundquist has indicated that most Border

¹¹Ibid., pp. 255 and 260.




Figure 2. Comparison of Richmond and Greenville in Republican Percentage of Total Presidential Vote, 1944-1972

South metropolitan centers have resisted the inroads of Republican power and organization at the state-local level,¹² and this certainly has been the case in Richmond. The Democratic party has maintained control in Richmond at the state house level, especially in the city.

According to Sundquist, black versus white alignments have developed in some black-belt metropolitan communities; in these communities the Democratic party has developed into a hard core of liberal integrationist and black supporters, often referred to as "the black man's party," and the Republican party has gained the bulk of white support. In other Deep South metropolitan communities, the Republican party has failed to achieve as strong a position.¹³ In such cases, it is possible that other patterns may be identified as variants in Deep South political behavior. According to data findings, Greenville has not developed the black-white alignment pattern found in some black-belt metropolitan communities; but then Greenville is not located in the black-belt even though it is in the Deep South. Instead, Greenville has developed a competitive two party system where each party has created an uneasy alliance between working class and middle class whites and where blacks appear to have been pushed out of any effective partisan role. The nature of the competing factions in each party suggests a possible variant of Deep South racially motivated electoral behavior. Even where blacks have been unable to exert political influence because of their numbers, both parties in Greenville are behaving and appealing to the same class coalition as the Republican party in many areas of the Deep South. Whether the Greenville pattern is unique or representative of other Deep South communities would be subject for further research. In any case, Greenville is exhibiting electoral behav-

¹²Ibid., p. 362.

¹³Ibid.

ior quite different in nature to that of the Border South and Richmond, particularly.

Conclusions

Racial Protest Voting

Racially motivated electoral behavior survives in the South, primarily as a protest vote. Protesting against the Democratic party which is perceived as having blatantly deserted the South at the national level, a sizable segment of the southern electorate has turned to the Republican party and independent movements to express their disapproval.

Working class racism. The racial protest vote is largely a working class white vote. This is not to say that the blue collar electorate monopolizes racial motivation in either community. The regression coefficients for social class do reveal a strong working class source for racially motivated protest voting. As we have stated earlier, middle class whites are more often isolated from blacks in terms of housing or job competition whereas the working class whites more often face the threats of black competition for housing and jobs. Perhaps this explains the salient nature of the racial issue for these people and the reason why it so emotionally charges their voting behavior.

The politically rootless working class. Volatility best describes the partisan direction of the working class protest vote. Protesting against the national Democratic party which has abandoned their racial interest at the presidential level, the protest voters have approached elections, particularly the presidential elections, with a careful eye to the candidates and their stands on current racial issues. In each presi-

dential election they have voted for that candidate which they viewed as best representing their racial interests, jumping from Republican party to Independent party and back again. On several occasions, notably 1952, 1964, and 1972, they turned to the Republican party. In 1948, 1956 (to a limited degree), and 1968 they voted for a third party. The protest voter as we have seen him now floats on the partisan sea, ready for realignment but not yet realigned and not likely to realign until the salience of the racial issue subsides or racial conservatism coheres about one of the major parties or a permanent new party. Unless normal working class economic interest can take precedence over racial anxieties, the first possibility seems unlikely. There is still no evidence to support the occurrence of the other possibilities.

Protest volatility seems most prominent at the presidential level. At the lowest electoral levels protest voters have retained their Democratic allegiance as in Richmond, or they have found satisfactory outlets in the Republican party as is partly the case in Greenville.

Richmond and Greenville as Different Urban Electorates

Some evidence supports the contention that Richmond is more characteristic of Border South and Greenville more characteristic of Deep South cities. Unquestionably their patterns of protest voting differ. Richmond fits Sundquist's description of the Border South metropolitan center perfectly whereas Greenville modifies his pattern of the Deep South metropolitan center. Greenville certainly does not fit the racial composition dimension of a typical black-belt city because of its small percentage of black population. Still its pattern of voting resembles more closely the Deep South than the Border South.

Distinctive Realignment?

Racially motivated voting certainly remains a part of southern politics, at least among one sizable segment of southern society, the working class. With each election this element surveys the candidates and issues carefully and casts its vote in accord with its racial prejudice rather than economic interest regardless of the party label. Yet another sizable segment of the southern electorate has made a rather stable realignment toward the Republican party seeming to reflect a choice related more to economic interest than racial attitudes.

Since "distinctive realignment" rests on the premise that the South has maintained a racially motivated electoral pattern while the rest of the nation has held to the New Deal realignment as discussed in an earlier chapter, we must investigate the possibility that the New Deal realignment is breaking down or changing or that the racial issue has taken on potency outside the South. At this point it is imperative to reassess the state of realignment in the nation as a whole and then make final assessment of southern politics vis-à-vis distinctive realignment or the national political scene.

CHAPTER VI

CASE STUDY IN RICHMOND AND GREENVILLE: WHAT IT TELLS US ABOUT THE SOUTH, PARTISAN REALIGNMENT, AND NATIONAL POLITICS

Throughout this dissertation southern electoral behavior has been discussed in terms of theories of southern behavior propounded in the fifties and sixties and with the assumption that national political behavior remained relatively stable in that period. In recent years, however, scholars have claimed that the national partisan alignments are beginning to shift; and they have suggested new theories of national political change.

In the two previous chapters we have raised several strategic questions: has the South come to resemble the traditional national partisan patterns, i. e., the New Deal partisan alignment, or does the South remain unique in its partisan alignment clinging to the exigencies of racial politics? If changes are occurring in national politics, then a third question must be asked in this final analysis. Does the South bear resemblance to a new national political pattern? The final section of this chapter will attempt to draw some conclusions concerning the South as it fits into the current complexion of national partisanship. First, however, we should briefly consider the possibility of national political change as well as review the major findings of this study.

Has the Nation Moved Away from the Traditional New Deal Party System?

Literature concerning American partisan politics in the 1960's and

1970's has proliferated as have the theories of what partisan changes are taking place, and what the future holds.¹ Two major themes emerge from this literature.

The 1960's: Disruption and Potential for Realignment

The onward thrust of the civil rights movement during the 1960's, the civil unrest and student protests of the late 1960's and early 1970's, the rising cry against crime, as well as the Vietnam protests caused new debate concerning the state of American partisan politics. Virtually all observers agree that this country has been through a period of vast political and social disruption. Some suggest that social issues have replaced or joined the traditional economic issues as the primary crosscutting political issues; most question the health of the New Deal party alignments as formulated in the 1930's and 1940's. Several scholars have suggested that the disruption of the 1960's and early 1970's indicates the demise of the New Deal party system and the formation of a new partisan alignment.

Kevin Phillips has theorized that in 1968 the nation crossed a political divide comparable to those of 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932 and that Richard Nixon is presiding over the beginning of a new cycle of Republican predominance.² Samuel Lubell sees the New Deal realignment shattered and unresolved national conflicts of the 1960's producing a new alignment

¹Kevin Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1969); Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970); Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970); Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970); and James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973). These five commentaries do not include all the works on the subject but hope to include those with the most significant contributions in the field. New titles on the subject are coming off the press even now.

²Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority, pp. 22, 25, and developed through the book.

of two incomplete, narrow-based coalitions, polarized against each other.³ Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg warn that the two major parties may be appealing to the extremes of American society in a losing strategy since the vast majority of the American electorate is now middle class, middle-aged, middle-minded, unyoung, unpoor, unblack. They advise the politicians of the 1970's to listen to the center before they attempt to move the center.⁴ Finally and most seriously, Walter Dean Burnham describes national partisan politics as both realigning and disintegrating. While he notes that the social maladjustments signaling critical realignments in the past are currently present, he asserts there exists an increasingly large group of voters attached to neither party and loyal to no traditional party system. For Burnham it is quite possible that the New Deal party alignment may be regarded one day as a temporary if massive deviation from the gradual disappearance of the political parties in the United States.⁵

Of all the literature reviewed, only Sundquist's commentary on national politics holds out much hope for a reassertion of the New Deal coalition's strength; and his analysis has the greatest perspective on time. Sundquist predicts the waning of some major crosscutting social issues of the late 1960's and the reintroduction of significant coincident issues--that is, issues that precipitate social cleavages falling along the same lines as those produced by the economic, activist-conservative issues of the New Deal party system. Sundquist does not deny the possibility of further gradual decomposition of the two party system; yet he feels that in the shorter run the march toward party

³Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics, p. 278.

⁴Scammon and Wattenberg, The Real Majority, p. 305.

⁵Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics, pp. 132-133.

decomposition will be checked or even reversed, that the New Deal party system will be invigorated, and that most of those who ceased identifying with one of the major parties in the recent turmoil will reidentify. The new partisan bonds may not be as strong as those of the 1930's and 1940's but may return to the degree of loyalty found in the 1950's and early 1960's.⁶

In conclusion, the conditions for national realignment have indeed existed, but actual realignment has not yet occurred. The kinds of issues dominant in the 1970's--be they social or economic--may well determine the continued health of the New Deal party system. As best we can determine, the New Deal party alignment survives, though in modified and weakened form, outside the South.

Southernization of National Politics

During the disruption of the late 1960's, the racial issue spilled out of the South and invaded many urban areas particularly. The activation of the racial issue outside the South affected the electoral behavior of the urban working class whites most significantly. If one can identify one major modification in the New Deal party system outside the South, it would be the increased tendency for working class whites to feel the pull of racial antipathies in their electoral choices in addition to the pulls of economic interest.

This increased racial antipathy has been expressed electorally by working class whites through their own party or by resort to an independent movement. The white resistance forces have not really tried to use the Republican party as their instrument nor have the Republican

⁶Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, p. 373.

leaders been willing to exploit the racial issue, except perhaps in the 1964 presidential election. Since most of the white resistance outside the South comes from within the Democratic party, it has emerged often in successful contests with more liberal local leadership.⁷

Political observers suggest that the degree of support for George Wallace in the North is the best indicator of the rise of the racial issue there. In 1968 Wallace ran in all 50 states and garnered 9.9 million votes, half of which came from outside the eleven southern states. In many northern working class white precincts as many as one-third of the voters were inclined to leave their traditional Democratic affiliation and follow a third-party candidate with essentially a one-issue platform. In 1972, Wallace entered many of the Democratic presidential primaries and showed that he had lost none of his appeal. Wallace polled an impressive 51% of the Democratic primary vote in Michigan where school busing and housing integration in the suburbs were big issues. He finished second in Indiana, West Virginia, New Mexico, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Oregon with strength varying from 20% to 42% of the Democratic vote.⁸ Now that Wallace is pledging another run in

⁷Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, pp. 360-362. Sundquist adds on page 360: "Thus the symbol of the white resistance in Philadelphia has been Mayor Frank L. Rizzo, the 'tough cop' police chief nominated by the Democratic organization. In Boston, it has been Louise Day Hicks, school board member and later congresswoman, a Democrat. In Cleveland, it has been James V. Stanton, city council president and later congressman, a Democrat. In the New York City mayoralty election of 1969 it was Mario Procaccino, Democratic candidate running against Mayor John V. Lindsay. In Gary, Indiana, it was the Democratic county organization. In Los Angeles, it was Mayor Sam Yorty, nominally a Democrat. And so on."

⁸Ibid., pp. 356-358. See also Scammon and Wattenberg, The Real Majority, which details the rise and decline of the Wallace strength in 1968 in Chapter 13.

1976, we can again measure the level of racial anxieties in the northern urban areas primarily among working class whites.

Several writers have labeled this spilling of racial tensions and racially motivated electoral behavior into the North as "southernization" of American politics or the "nationalization of southern politics." Lubell sees the Wallace vote among northern workers as evidence of a new nationalizing force making the politics of the North and South more alike.⁹ Walter Burnham suggests that the tremendous migration of rural southerners, particularly of blacks, into our major northern cities, has "nationalized the racial polarity and hostility which has long been a hallmark of the South."¹⁰

Unquestionably, racial tension and anxiety have surfaced as major issues outside the South. One need only look to disorder in South Boston in the fall of 1975 to confirm its continuing existence. In many areas of the North where school busing and housing pressures by blacks are evident, where unemployment is high, and where the local economy is weak, a sizable segment of the voters will indeed be torn between racial antipathies and the economic pull of the Democratic party, as Lubell predicts. These cross-pressures and the resulting political instability will continue until the racial issue can be defused, probably a long time off.

Conclusions

The convergence and distinctive realignment theories discussed earlier in this dissertation take on new meaning as we have discussed current literature on partisan alignment and realignment. Two observations

⁹Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics, pp. 85-87.

¹⁰Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics, p. 142.

inevitably affect the final discussions concerning the South vis-à-vis the national party system.

First, a theme found throughout the literature, the nation is in or has passed through a period of severe social and political disruption. During much of the period studied here, the Vietnam issue was raging, racial issues were burning, other social issues such as "law and order" were in the forefront of political battle. What had happened to the New Deal party system developed in the 1930's? Scholars speculated that we were entering a period of realignment where social and racial issues would play a greater role. One even suggested that we were entering a period of Republican hegemony. Only one of the five authors reviewed saw much hope for continuance of the New Deal party system. Writing in 1973, James Sundquist saw the Vietnam war and social issues, with the exception of race, defused as major crosscutting voting issues and saw the reemergence of important coincident economic issues. He held out the possibility of a continued and reinvigorated New Deal party system.

Second, the North has experienced many of the tensions and antipathies related to race previously associated only with the South. The result has been the success of the Wallace movement at the polls and a large increase in sympathy toward his movement. Another result has been challenge to the existing political machinery, often successful, allowing the election of candidates in northern cities sympathetic to white resistance. A third result is the growing electoral volatility of the working classes in northern cities, a phenomenon similar to what we have seen in our two cities in this study. This southernization of national politics, as Lubell terms it, nullifies in large measure the idea of a "distinctive" realignment in the South.

Major Study Findings

This study has aimed to gain a better grasp of what is happening politically in the South through the examination of two representative but different southern communities. With the research and preliminary observations behind us, we must now consider the major findings and then see what they tell us about southern politics, partisan realignment, and national politics.

Three major findings emerge from this study. The first two concern the relationship of the electorate to economic or racial issues. The third concerns the relationship between the two cities under study.

The Middle Class and the Economic Issue

According to our study data, significant numbers of southern middle class whites, those employed in white collar occupations, have realigned their vote, if not their allegiance, with the Republican party. These middle class southerners appear to have broken their ties of allegiance to the Democratic party and have begun to relate to politics in terms of their economic interests instead of the traditional racial interests. Economic issues have formed the basis of partisan cleavage in national politics since the 1930's; and now in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's one major and growing segment of the southern electorate, the middle class white, is falling in line with the national tendency for the more affluent, better-educated middle class whites to adhere to the Republican party.

The degree of Republican realignment in our two communities varies from one electoral level to another and differs to a degree in the two cities. The realignment process has reached greatest development at

the presidential level in both communities, and the large numbers of middle class Republicans have provided substantial stability to presidential voting patterns despite see-sawing vote totals. Middle class Republicanism is gaining ground in both cities at the gubernatorial election level also with notable gains in the latest elections. At the local level realignment has made little or no headway in Richmond and a great deal of headway in Greenville where factors other than economic may explain the realignment.

Working Class Whites and the Racial Issue

Whereas a significant middle class segment in the electorate is voting in accord with economic interests, another major element, the working class white, shows no indication of voting primarily according to economic interests. The force of economic issues outside the South has inclined working class whites to identify consistently with the Democratic party since the 1930's; however, a significant working class white element in the South is instead voting first for one party and then for another in accord with its racial interests and attitudes.

This electoral pattern is by far most evident at the presidential level where it has taken the form of volatile protest against the Democratic party. Working class whites have turned to the Republicans and then to independent movements giving Goldwater a large share of his vote, Nixon his heavy 1972 majority, and Wallace a sizable share of his vote. At the national level, the exigencies of racial anxieties have overruled economic interests for working class whites in these two communities.

At the lower electoral levels, the degree of volatility in working class voting behavior is greatly reduced. In many cases this element has found adequate expression of its racial interests in the Democratic party.

On occasion a Wallace-type independent candidate may attract attention, or the Republican candidate may draw votes; but the overwhelming protest to the Democratic party is much less obvious. Whereas working class whites are behaving similarly at the presidential level in both cities, the patterns take on much more community individuality at the lower levels.

Richmond and Greenville as Differing Urban Electorates

The last major finding in this study indicates that Richmond and Greenville do vary in their electoral patterns and that these differences may relate to their Border South-Deep South locations. At the presidential level, despite similarities already mentioned, the electoral patterns of the two communities fall along lines that James Sundquist has distinguished as Border South-Deep South differences. Richmond has closely followed the nationwide vote over the last thirty years although the Richmond electorate has tended to vote slightly more Republican than the nation in most elections. This pattern typifies many Border South cities, according to Sundquist. On the other hand, the presidential voting pattern in Greenville fluctuates away from the national pattern in a manner typical, though less extreme than that, of many Deep South cities.

At the state house-local level, Richmond remains thoroughly dominated by the Democratic party, a pattern seen typical of the Border South. Greenville, in contrast, has developed a competitive two party system where each party has two competing factions of middle class and working class whites. In many areas of the Deep South, especially in the black-belt areas, black-white alignments have occurred where middle class and working class whites are aligning within the Republican party, and blacks and a few liberal whites are remaining within the Democratic party. Although a Deep South city, Greenville has a small black population and a

poorly organized black electorate. Despite the lack of black political power in the community, Greenville's two parties resemble the partisan alliance of the middle class and working class whites typical of the Republican party elsewhere in the Deep South.

Southern Politics and National Politics: What Our Case Study
Tells Us About Their Relationship

We have chosen two southern urban areas in which to survey electoral politics in the last decade or so. These two communities may not be typical of all southern urban areas; but they represent many of the social and economic patterns typical of many southern cities, and both emerge out of the same one-party Democratic tradition. To the extent that these two communities have experienced patterns of growth and development and political change common to many cities in the South, we can generalize from the data here and speculate about politics in the urban South and how it now fits into the national political picture. Several of the most significant observations follow.

Southern Politics Resemble Nationwide Political Patterns More Closely
Today Than a Decade or So Ago

The New Deal party system may be under severe strain today, and the idea of convergence as traditionally conceived may be out of date; but the fact remains that Democratic dominance has disappeared in the South, and a degree of competitive politics more typical of the nation has replaced that traditional dominance. Moreover, as is traditional in most areas of the nation, voting choices in the South are beginning to fall along class lines. At least, middle class whites have developed a tendency to vote Republican as is frequently true of the more affluent, better-educated white collar whites outside the South.

According to James Sundquist, partisan realignment in response to the New Deal took place in two stages. Realignment took place quickly at the national level but then took much longer to reach the lower electoral levels. Sundquist says that the South is following a similar pattern but at a much slower pace. The data certainly bear this out. In Richmond Republicans made rapid inroads at the presidential level in the fifties but only now are beginning to develop durable support at the gubernatorial level as well. The experience in Greenville is somewhat telescoped, but presidential realignment appeared first.

Southernization of National Politics Is Part of This Convergence Pattern

Political patterns in the South today resemble more closely those found nationwide not only because the South has moved politically but also because the nation itself has changed politically. Distinctive realignment, in the sense that it involves partisan alignments based on racially motivated electoral behavior, appears limited to working class whites in our two communities; but national political trends indicate that such an alignment of working class whites in the South has lost its distinctiveness. Race has become a strong polarizing issue among northern working class whites as well as southern working class whites.

Among those working class whites, North and South, who often live in close proximity to blacks or in tight job competition, racial anxieties rival economic interests in expression of political attitude and in making political choices. As a result, working class whites all over the nation, though perhaps most in the South, have behaved erratically at the polls. Both North and South these people have strongly felt the appeal of George Wallace, and many in both sectors have voted for him.

Southern Politics Is Still Not the Same as National Politics

In many respects the South may have joined the nation politically in recent years, but the South probably remains this nation's most distinctive region politically, socially, and otherwise. The South has undoubtedly resisted change more vehemently, has evolved more slowly than the nation as a whole, and has retained, especially in the Deep South, more deep-seated racially conservative political behavior and more deeply conservative political and social outlooks.

Southern Politics Is Not a Monolith

One community, and probably two, cannot adequately represent southern political behavior. Despite similarities which characterize both communities studied here, these two communities clearly illustrate that electoral behavior takes different forms in the South as is the case outside the South. The greatest similarities between the two cities in electoral behavior have appeared at the national level of voting, and the greatest differences have appeared at local election levels although significant differences were noted at the national election level as well.

The differences in political behavior in southern cities may relate to state political environment and to social and economic composition of the cities; but data substantiate the possibility of a Border South-Deep South cleavage as well. Realignment research indicates that Border South communities are falling into national political patterns more so than Deep South communities. Richmond's geographic location and its partisan patterns in the last fifteen years clearly place the city in the Border South. Greenville's partisan patterns at all levels, but most clearly demonstrated at the local levels, appear more closely related to

Deep South patterns. Many Deep South cities, particularly in the black-belt areas, have developed black-white alignments at the local levels where middle class and working class whites have formed a coalition in the Republican party, and blacks and a few liberal whites have remained to support the Democratic party. Although located in the Deep South, Greenville has a small black population; and the black electorate has been excluded from significant political power in either party. Nonetheless, both parties in Greenville resemble the middle class/working class white coalition found in Republican parties elsewhere in the Deep South. Greenville's partisan experience, in the absence of a significant black factor, serves to verify the reality of a Deep South pattern.

Concluding Statements

In the final analysis we cannot conclude that the South, even its more rapidly moving outer edge, has moved into total congruence with national politics. Southern politics have changed bringing the South into the mainline of American politics in some respects. National politics have changed; political parties have been caught in the disruptive issues of American political and social change, and racial anxieties typical of the South have spread to northern cities thus southernizing in some degree national politics. Southerners can identify with national politics in ways never possible before; yet they retain racial attitudes and deeply conservative outlooks which will continue to separate them.

The study of electoral behavior in two southern communities has elucidated the role of social class and race in political change in the South and has emphasized the differences as well as similarities in southern communities. Further studies of this kind could illustrate and

confirm further differences between Border South and Deep South communities, could study patterns of Deep South political change and alignment especially at the lower levels, could uncover other sources of political differences in southern communities, as well as reinforce or alter findings concerning the behavior and role of social class and race in southern politics.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Margaret Allen Aiesi was born June 10, 1945 in Richmond, Virginia. In June, 1963, she was graduated from St. Catherine's School. In June, 1967, she received the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Distinction with a major in Political Science from Duke University. In September, 1968, she enrolled in the Graduate School of the University of Florida. She worked as a graduate assistant in the Department of Political Science while she pursued her work toward the degree of Master of Arts which she received in August, 1970. Since that time, while her husband has been on the faculty of Furman University in Greenville, South Carolina, she has combined family responsibilities and academic endeavors to complete course work, take written examinations, and complete the dissertation and other requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


Margaret Allen Aiesi is married to Donald Paul Aiesi, who received his Doctor of Philosophy degree in Political Science from the University of Florida in 1971. She is the mother of one child and expects another at the same time as the conferral of this degree.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



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
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